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This paper generates monthly risk premia data using zero coupon gov-
ernment treasury bills for 43 countries over the period of 1994-2006. The
measure of risk premia is based on the ARCH-in-Mean (ARCH-M) model
introduced by Engle, Lilien and Robins(1987). We show thatthe risk pre-
mia are time varying and also vary considerably across sample countries.
Countries with better …nancial development and higher income generally
have lower risk premia of government assets. This study also examines
the macroeconomic and political determinants of the risk premia by using
cross-section and dynamic panel regression analyses. The results show
that the risk premia are signi…cantly a¤ected by macroeconomic circum-
stances, especially economic growth and the real e¤ective exchange rate.
The results are robust across the majority of countries in our study.
¤The author would like to thank Andrew Pickering for his excellent supervision and
Jonathan Temple for his advice on panel regression methodologies. This paper has also
been inspired from the internship project “Determinants of Term Structures (yield curve):
An Empirical Analysis of East Asian Local Currency Bond Markets”, during Sept.-Dec. 2005
at the Asian Development Bank, Manila, Philippines. The usual disclaimer applies. Email:
P.Chantapacdepong@bristol.ac.uk.
11 Introduction
This paper studies the behavior of the risk premia of short term government as-
sets (treasury bills). The paper makes 2 contributions to the literature. Firstly,
we generate monthly risk premia data using zero coupon government treasury
bills for 43 countries over the period of 1994-2006. The risk premia measure
is based on the ARCH-in-Mean (ARCH-M) model introduced by Engle, Lilien
and Robins (1987). The estimation of the risk premia in this paper can perform
the same function as the agencies’ credit ratings as it allows us to extract the
market perceptions of the risk in holding government assets. Moreover, the risk
premia data generated in this study are somewhat more continuous and more
time varying measure of risk in holding government asset than the risk indices
based on credit ratings. We …nd that the risk premia are time varying and also
vary considerably across countries. The second contribution of this paper is that
we examine the macroeconomic and political determinants of the risk premia
by using cross section and dynamic panel regression analyses. The results show
that the risk premia are signi…cantly a¤ected by macroeconomic circumstances,
especially economic growth and the real e¤ective exchange rate. The results are
robust across the majority of countries in our study.
The risk premia series in this study are proxied by the time series volatility
of the excess holding yields for short- and long-term treasury bills. Thus the
risk premia in this study correspond to the term premia in the theory of the
term structure of interest rates, I will use these two terms interchangeably.
The process used to construct risk premia data follows the argument of Engle,
Lilien and Robins (1987), and associates the mean of the excess returns on
holding long-term comparing to short-term government bills to the volatility of
the excess returns. It focuses on the fundamental trade-o¤ between expected
returns and their volatility. The theoretical appeal of this model is that it
2provides microeconomics foundations by measuring the response of risk averse
economic agents to uncertainty using the time series data. Estimating the risk
premia from the treasury bills data is relevant to previous studies which have
documented that the treasury bills rates contain time varying term premia1.
There is an abundance of work on the term structure of interest rate but
this focuses mainly on the validity of the expectations hypothesis. Empirical
evidence of time varying risk premia in government asset returns is frequently
interpreted as evidence against the expectations hypothesis. However, we need
a better understanding of the determinants of the term premia. This will in
turn give clearer explanation for the rejection of expectations hypothesis.
The literature has not yet fully identi…ed the determinants of risk premia in
government assets. There are a few works that attempt to relate the term struc-
ture to movements in macroeconomic variables such as Wu (2002), Hordahl,
Tristani, and Vestin (2003), and Rudebusch and Wu (2003). However, these
works ignore the role of time-varying risk premia which is an important com-
ponent in explaining movements in yields over time. Ang and Piazzesi (2003)
suggest that macroeconomic factors (in‡ation and economic growth factors)
have an important explanatory role for the dynamics of the yield curve, and
that including these variables in a term structure model can improve its one-
step ahead forecasting performance2. They …nd that macro factors explain up
to 85% of the observed variation in bond yields. Hordahl, Tristani and Vestin
(2004) employ macroeconomic variables to indirectly explain the risk premia.
Their paper explains how macroeconomic factors (in‡ation, output gaps and
1Many papers provide evidence that the risk (term) premium in term structure of interest
rate varies over time instead of being constant. Parts of this evidence consist of repeated rejec-
tion of the expectation hypothesis [Shiller, 1979; Startz, 1982; Shiller, Campbell and Schoen-
holtz, 1983; Fama, 1984; Mankiw, 1986; Mankiw and Miron, 1986; Shiller, 1986; Campbell,
1987; Engel, Lilien and Robins, 1987; Fama and Bliss, 1987; Shiller and McCulloch, 1987;
Hardouvelis, 1988; Froot, 1989; Simon, 1989; Campbell and Shiller, 1991 and others]
2Their two stage estimation methods is based on the asssumption that short term interest
rates do not a¤ect macroeconomic variables.
3the short term policy interest rates) drive movements in the term structure of
interest rates and how they a¤ect the behavior of the risk premia embedded
in observed yields. Their paper utilises a dynamic term structure model based
on macroeconomic factors, which allows for an explicit feedback from the short
term policy rates to macroeconomic outcomes. At the same time, the explicit
modelling of risk premia captures dynamics of the entire term structures. They
conclude that the dynamics of risk premia can ultimately be attributed to un-
derlying macroeconomic dynamics3.
This paper can be divided into two main parts. In the …rst part, we generate
measures of the risk premia of government securities for 43 countries over the
period 1994-2006. In the latter part, we …nd the determinant of the risk premia
using the data generated from the …st part. In examining the determinants of
risk premia, we carefully deal with the characteristics of small sample sizes in
our study. In the cross section regression analysis, we use the small sample
version of the heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimates (HC3)
suggested by MacKinnon and White (1985) to improve the performance of the
analysis in small samples. In the dynamic panel regression, the determinants
of risk premia are estimated using a Least Squares Dummy Variable Corrected
(LSDVC) procedure proposed by Bruno (2005). This estimator is a recently
proposed panel data technique that is suitable for small samples in unbalanced
panels.
The result from the cross section analysis can be brie‡y summarised as
follows. On average, over the period 1994-2006, the risk premia for holding gov-
ernment assets required by risk averse investors is positively associated with the
level of in‡ation and the budget de…cit as a percentage of GDP (both variables
are signi…cant at the 1 percent level), and is negatively a¤ected by the country’s
3Anyhow, the paper did not include the foreign variables or exchange rate, which will
provide fully satisfactory account of macroeconomic dynamics in the country of study e.g.
Germany.
4economic growth (signi…cant at the 5 percent level). Additionally, low income
countries are estimated to have risk premia about 19 percent higher than in the
high income countries outside the Eurozone, holding other variables constant.
In the high income countries outside the Eurozone, the risk premia on holding
government assets is predicted to be 10 percent more than those in Eurozone.
Using panel data analysis, we found that economic growth and the volatility
of real e¤ective exchange rates are the main determinants of the risk premia in
the full sample. Risk averse investors require lower risk premia for holding gov-
ernment assets in countries with good economic performance i.e. high economic
growth and a stable external price competitive position i.e. low volatility of
real e¤ective exchange rate. If we split the sample by income group, economic
growth remains the main determinant of the risk premia. However, we also …nd
that the real e¤ective exchange rate plays an interesting and important role: in
high income countries, devaluations bring favorable results to the economy as
consistent with the Mundell-Fleming model. There is a better price competitive-
ness which in turn reduces the country risk premia. The opposite relationship is
found in the sample of low income countries. One possible mechanism explain-
ing this may be that in …nancial vulnerable countries, weaker local currency can
exacerbate the external debt service di¢culties. Devaluations therefore raise
the country risk premia. This corresponds to the results from Cespedes, Chang
and Velasco (2000).
The paper is organised as follows. The following section …rst outlines the
de…nition of the risk premia and the departure from the existing literature. We
then present a theoretical model for the ARCH-M methodology of time varying
risk premia following Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987). Next, we construct mea-
sures of the time varying risk premia for 43 countries over the period of 1994
to 2006. The results show that, in general, term premia exist, are time varying
5and di¤erent between countries. After deriving measures of the term premia, we
then ask what factors determine the movements in risk premia and what makes
it vary across countries and through time4. Using cross sectional and panel data
regression analysis. Our main aim is to establish how macroeconomic, …nan-
cial and political conditions determine the di¤erences in risk premia. The …nal
section concludes.
2 Risk premia and related literatures
In this section, we …rst discuss the concept of the risk premia. We explain the
rationale for estimating the risk premia from the term structure of interest rates.
We also explain why the risk premia estimated here provides an alternative to
those used in previous literatures. Lastly, we brie‡y discuss the rationale for
using the ARCH-M model to estimate the risk premia.
The risk premium is the di¤erential in the expected rate of return on a
risky asset as compared with a safe asset. The risk associated with holding
government assets can be classi…ed into 2 aspects; the pure time factor of the
risk, and the risk of default.
The pure time factor of risk refers to the term or maturity risk, and this is
directly related to the term structure of interest rates in monetary economics
through the expectation hypothesis. This hypothesis states that the interest rate
on the long term asset must equal the average of the expected future interest
rate on short term assets plus the term premium [Campbell and Schiller, 1991].
Hence, this term premium is simply an increment of return required to induce
investors to longer term securities. The longer maturities entail greater risks for
4Assuming that investors form their expectations concerning movements in the interest
rate using all available information, perfect capital mobility no longer implies that interest
rates on the same asset class are equal across countries. The widely used measure of risk in
…nance is the volatility, however, in an arbitrage free economy; the risk perceived corresponds
to the relevant information available to an investor as well.
6the investor. With longer maturities, more catastrophic events might occur that
may impact the investment, hence the need for a risk (term) premium5. This
pure time factor of risk premia series can be directly estimated by the ARCH-M
model by Engle et. al. (1987).
The risk of default refers to the likelihood of the loan not being repaid.
Although it is generally recognised that securities issued by governments are
relatively safer than other types of assets, the risk associated with holding them
as perceived by international investors, varies according to the economic and
political conditions of the country of issuer6. This risk is thus country speci…c
and is regarded as a country’s credit-risk.
Previous literature addressing cross country comparison of risk premia in-
cludes Alesina, DeBroek, Prati and Tabellini , 1992; Lemmen and Goodheart
, 1999; Giavannini and Piga, 1994; Favero, Giavazzi and Spaventa, 1996; IMF,
1997; Mc Cauley, 1996; Eij…nger, Huizinga and Lemmen, 1998 . However, these
works examine risk premia based on the credit risk of government debt. I be-
lieve that the measure of the risk premia in my study is a somewhat better
measure of risk in holding government assets than the government defaulted
risk constructed by previous literatures in several ways as follows.
Alesina et. al. (1992) study the default risk on government debt in OECD
countries. The risk is derived by comparing the return from holding government
debt with the return from holding corporate debt denominated in the same
currency. However, the drawback is that the measure of default risk tends to
be sensitive to signi…cant changes in private risk. Additionally, Alesina et. al.
5This explanation depends on the distant future beingmore uncertain than the near future,
and risk of future adverse events (such as default and higher short-term interest rates) being
higher than the chance of future positive events (such as lower short-term interest rates).
6This concept is quite similar to the asset market and portfolio balance approach in inter-
national economics which states that domestic and foreign bonds are not perfect substitutes
and foreign bonds carry some additional risk with respect to domestic bonds. However, in
some countries with less …nancial stability, the domestic bonds may be relatively more risky
than the government bonds in developed countries.
7(1992) consider a variety of di¤erent maturities for both public and private
yields. However, di¤erences in the maturity between the public and private
yields may lead to inaccurate measurement of the magnitude of government
default risk.
Lemmen and Goodheart (1999) …nd the determinants of credit risk in the
European government bond markets using …xed e¤ects estimation. The risk
speci…ed in their work is the default risk (credit risk) proxy by the spread of
10-year benchmark government bond yields over the corresponding swap yield
of the same 10-year maturity denominated in the same currency. Although
the risk speci…ed in Lemmen et. al. o¤er an improvement to the one used by
Alesina et. al. (1992), the risk measure still has several problems. Firstly,
the risk premia may not be a good proxy for country risk if the government
private bonds interact with each other. According to Lemmen et. al. (1999),
uncertainty about government debt servicing will a¤ect private sector risks par-
ticularly when bank or other …nancial institutions hold large proportion of their
assets in government debt, leading private and public risks to move in a lockstep
fashion. Secondly, Lemmen et. al. consider government bond redemption yield
data. The use of redemption yields introduces coupon reinvestment risks in the
default risk measure. The redemption yield depends on the coupon size. To
solve this problem, we use zero coupon yields data to calculate the risk premia.
Other works employ the credit risk of sovereign debt, which can be assessed
by comparing yields on domestic government bonds with high quality private
risk represented by interest rate swap yields [Giavannini and Piga, 1994; Favero,
Giavazzi and Spaventa, 1996; IMF, 1997; Mc Cauley, 1996; Eij…nger, Huizinga
and Lemmen, 1998]. The risk premia measures in these literatures cannot dis-
tinguish between credit risk and liquidity risk. The measure of the risk premia
in these studies requires the assumption that variations in liquidity are negli-
8gible. However, liquidity e¤ects may play a central role in government assets
return. In my study, the liquidity e¤ect is automatically taken into account in
the risk premia estimation.
3 Methodology: Measuring risk premia
This section describes the construction of our risk premia data. Section 3.1
describes the source of data for calculating the excess holding yield for 6 month
treasury bills over 3 month treasury bills in 43 countries over the sample period
of 1994:12 to 2006:2. Due to the limited availability of the zero coupon yield
data, there are 43 countries in our studies. These include both developed and
developing countries. See table 1.1 for a list of countries, data de…nition and
the period of observation. Section 3.2 presents the theoretical derivation of the
time varying risk premia. Section 4.1 uses the calculated excess holding return
to generate the risk premia data by applying the ARCH-M methodology. The
formulation closely follows Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987). The risk premia
is the dependent variables in the cross section regression and the panel data
analysis in sections 5 and 6, respectively.
3.1 The data
The term structure data available in each country start in di¤erent years and
was collected from Bloomberg L.P. We use monthly observations of the yield
on short term assets, i.e. 3 month- and 6-month treasury bills, to calculate the
excess holding yield. We use the volatility of excess holding yield to generate
the risk premia.
Instead of using the outstanding coupon treasury securities to calculate the
excess holding yields, we use the calculated zero coupon instruments (…xed
income) instead. This methodology is the same as Dotsey and Otrok (1995)
9and Harris (2004)7. The zero coupon instruments make a single payment at the
maturity date. The size of the payment is the face value of the instruments. The
advantage of the zero coupon bills is that it is free of liquidity and coupon e¤ects
that are common in outstanding treasury securities. The data is, therefore, of
the same type as that is analyzed in Campbell and Schiller (1991). This type
of data is suitable for the analysis of term structure of interest rate since they
have no e¤ects from di¤erent coupons and compounding methods. To interpret
a zero coupon yield index, the zero coupon yields are derived by stripping the
par coupon curve. For example, the USD Government Agency (FMC84) Zero
Coupon Yield is the zero coupon rate derived by stripping FMC8 curve84. Most
of the yield indices are denominated in national currencies except Turkey, Brazil
and Uruguay. These 3 countries are denominated in US Dollars. The dataset
we obtained here is daily reported, and the last observation of each month is
therefore chosen to serve as the end of month observation. Naturally, the 30th
or 31st data of each month is used except for national Holidays or other non-
trading days.
In estimating the term premia, we …rst de…ne the excess holding yield. The
formula for constructing the excess holding yield of 6-month over 3-month zero
coupon treasury bills is analogous to Engle, et. al. (1987), Dotsey et. al. (1995)
and Harris (2004). To set the notation, y
6;3
t is de…ned as the excess holding
return from holding a 6-month treasury bill compared to the return from holding
consecutive 3-month treasury bills. Rt is the 6-month zero coupon treasury bill
rate and rt is the zero coupon yield of the treasury bill with maturity of 3
months. The excess holding period yield can therefore be calculated as:
7Engle, et. al. (1987) uses the treasury bills rate to calculate the riks premia. However,
the US treasury bills are zero coupon bills in that they do not pay interest prior to maturity;
instead they are sold at a discount of the par value to create a positive yield to maturity.
8FMC stands for Fair market value curve. The fair market value indices are derived from
data points on Bloomberg’s option free market curves. The yield at each maturity point






2 =(1 + rt+1)
i
¡ (1+ rt) ; (1)
and following Engle et. al (1987), the linear approximation of equation (1) is
used to calculate the excess holding yield as follow,
y
6;3
t = 2Rt ¡ rt+1 ¡ rt:
Prior to generating the risk premia, it is useful to brie‡y explain the de-
scriptive statistics of the excess holding yield in the di¤erent countries. This
will help in visualising the expected characteristics of risk premia.
Table 2.1 illustrates descriptive statistics of the excess holding yield gener-
ated from equations (1). The standard deviation of the return measures the
average deviations of the return series from its mean, and is often used as a
measure of risk. A large standard deviation implies that there have been large
swings in the return series of assets. The number of observations is represented
by number of months observed. The main …ndings are summarised as follows.
Firstly, the mean of the excess holding yield for 6 months vs 3 months of
our sample countries is positive in sign with value between 0 to 1 per cent per
annum. Argentina and Uruguay are exceptions, the mean of the excess return
is -3.95 and -0.99 percent per annum, respectively. This means that an investor
would be better o¤ if he keeps investing in a shorter term asset (3-month bill)
for a year than buying a single 6-month treasury bill which gives less return
in time t + 1: Additionally, the excess holding yield of government securities
in these 2 countries is extremely volatile with standard deviations of 18.09 and
9.73 in Argentina and Uruguay9, respectively. The data available for Argentina




: In table 2.2, the standard deviation of excess return in Argentina
and Uruguay are 48.96 and 35.15, respectively. The excess holding yield in these 2 countries
are also the most volatile among 43 countries in this study.
11is from 1998:07 to 2002:03. Hence, it includes the time of economic crisis in
Argentina in 2001-2002. This entailed output falling by 20 percent over 3 years,
high in‡ationary pressure, a severe devaluation of Argentine peso, government
debt default, and lastly, a stagnant banking system. Over the period of study,
the excess holding yield in Argentina hit its low at -71.716 per cent per annum
in late 2001. This probably re‡ects the lack of con…dence in economic prospects
as investors do not want to take a risk in longer term assets. From Figure 1.1,
thanks to the currency board, we can see a period of stability in the excess
holding yield from late 1998 to late 2000. The volatility coincides with the time
of crisis10.
In 2003, Uruguay ( see Figure 1.41) went through a similar economic and
…nancial crisis which developed mostly from external factors, not least the crisis
in Argentina. The crisis started by the devaluation in Brazilian Reais in 1999
made Uruguayan exports relatively less competitive. In late 2000, the situa-
tion was exacerbated by the economic crisis in Argentina, which is Uruguay’s
major trading partner. Subsequently in mid 2002 there was a bank run due to
massive withdrawals from Uruguayan banks. The bank run was unfortunately
overcame by massive borrowing from international …nancial institutions which
in turn, led to a serious debt sustainability problem. Unsurprisingly, there was
considerable volatility in the excess holding period return during late-2001 to
mid-2002. Although Uruguay’s economy recovered in 2003 through improv-
ing its export performance and a more positive investment climate, the excess
holding yield swung wildly over the studied period. This re‡ects a persisting
unstable …nancial system.
At the other extreme is the excess holding return of government securities
in the Philippines which has a mean value of 1.91 percent per annum. It is
also highly volatile with a standard deviation of 2.10. Figure 1.32 shows that
10Unfortuantely, we cannot obtain the zero coupon yield data for Argentina after 2002:03.
12the excess holding yield ‡uctuates wildly throughout the period of study. The
excess holding yield is especially volatile with the sharp spikes in 1997-1998 and
in late 2000 owing probably to the Asian …nancial crisis and oil price shocks,
respectively. On the other hand, the Philippines was less severely a¤ected by
the Asian …nancial crisis of 1998 than its neighbors, aided in part by its high
level of annual remittances from overseas workers, and no sustained run up in
asset prices or foreign borrowing prior to the crisis. The impact from surging
petroleum prices shock during late 2000 was more serious since the Philippines
is an oil importer. Overall, we …nd that the excess rates of return from holding
Philippines’ securities are highly erratics.
Apart from the countries already mentioned, there have also been large
swings in the excess return series in Brazil, with a standard deviation of 4.27
(see table 2.1). This is probably because Brazil was also a¤ected by the South
American economic crisis of 2002. Like other emerging market economies in
general, Brazil was susceptible to contagion e¤ects. In Brazil’s case, it was
contagion from Argentina’s economic melt down causing a crisis of con…dence
among investors and lenders who were demanding higher interest rates. That
put increasing pressure on the Brazilian economy to come up with those higher
interest rates. Figure 1.5 shows that the excess holding yield series is again
extremely volatile.
Our second …nding is that the average excess holding return is statistically
not di¤erent from zero over the period of observation in all 43 countries. How-
ever, we cannot yet conclude that the excess holding yield has a zero mean in
the long run. This basically highlights the fact that there is a lot of noise. The
high standard deviations distort the result and cause the mean to be statisti-
cally equal to zero over the short sample period. The extreme examples are
Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil as we have discussed.
13Thirdly, the excess holding yield series which are less volatile relate to
economies with stable …nancial systems and better economic development. For
example, the mean of the excess return is relatively lower but exhibits much less
variation over time in the majority of countries in the EU, compared to the rest
of the world.
Additionally, among EU member countries, the excess return series of gov-
ernment assets in Turkey, Poland, and Hungary are highly volatile with the
standard deviation of 1.63, 1.48 and 1.40. The mean excess holding yield of
these countries ranges from 0.02 to 0.46 percent annually.
Among countries in the Asia Paci…c region (excepting the Philippines), the
average excess holding yield is between 0.11 to 0.59 percent per annum. The
volatility of excess returns is not much higher than those in the EU countries,
except in the Philippines and Hong Kong. The excess return in the Philippines
is highly volatile with a standard deviation of 2.10, and mean return of 1.91
percent per annum.
Lastly, the excess return of 12-month over 3-month zero coupon rate is con-
structed to test the robustness of the econometric results. y
12;3
t is de…ned as the
excess holding period returns from holding 12-month treasury bills for 3 months
compared to the return from holding 3-month treasury bills. The unit of time
period in t stands for every 3 months11. Following the same fashion as (1), the








(1+ rt+3)(1 + rt+2) (1+ rt+1)
#
¡ (1+ rt) ; (2)
and the linear approximation is
11Thus, the time t is actually 3 months ahead of time t +1:
14y
12;3
t = 4Rt ¡ rt+3 ¡ rt+2 ¡ rt+1 ¡ rt:
Table 2.2 illustrates descriptive statistics of the excess holding yield gener-
ated from equation (2). The results show that mean and volatility of excess
return are increasing with maturity of longer term bonds. There is higher un-
certainty associating with the longer horizon, thus investors require more excess
return. The excess return series are also more ‡uctuate with longer maturity
spread. In table 2.2, the standard deviation of excess return in Argentina and
Uruguay are 48.96 and 35.15, respectively. The excess holding yield in these 2
countries are also the most volatile among 43 countries in this study.
The next section describes how the excess holding yield data can be used to
construct risk premia.
3.2 The theoretical derivation of time varying risk premia
Engle, et. al. (1987) construct an ARCH-M model where the conditional vari-
ance of excess return determines the current risk premium. They then test
their model by applying it to quarterly data on 3-month comparing to 6-month
US treasury bill rates from 1960:Q1 to 1984:Q2. The data are obtained from
Salomon Brothers. The results shows that the risk premia vary systematically
over time with agent’s perceptions of underlying uncertainty.
In this section we generate measures of the term premium by estimating the
ARCH-M model of excess holding yields for 6 month treasury bills over 3 month
treasury bills over the sample period of 1994:12 to 2006:2. The formulation
closely follows Engle, et. al. (1987) and speci…es that the contemporaneous
expected conditional standard deviation of the error term be included in the
mean equation of the excess holding yield. This speci…cation follows from a
micro-founded model with risk averse agents.
15Firstly, the excess holding yield can be decomposed:
yt = „t + "t; (3)
where (yt) is the excess holding yield on 6 month zero coupon treasury bills.
The non-stochastic term „t is the risk premium or the expected return that the
risk averse investor would demand for holding the (riskier) long-term asset. In
contrast, "t is the di¤erence between the ex ante and ex post rate of return which
is unforecastable in an e¢cient market. This means that the expected excess
return from holding the longer-term asset is just equal to the risk premium
[Et¡1yt = „t].
The equation for risk premium is expressed as
„t = ﬂ + –ht; – > 0; (4)
where ht is the conditional standard deviation of the unforecastable shocks
("t) to the excess return on the long term asset. The term – is the coe¢cient of
relative risk aversion. The risk premium is assumed to be an increasing function
of the conditional standard deviation of the unforecastable shocks ("t).
The conditional variance of the error term is h2
t and is a function of the
information set available to investors.
h
2
t = V ar("tj all available information) (5)
We note here that the model takes the mean as a linear function of the stan-





. This represents the assumption
that changes in the variance are re‡ected less than proportionally in the mean.
This speci…cation has been widely used by other papers such as Domowitz and
16Hakko (1985), and Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge (1988).
Following Engle, et. al. (1987), it is assumed that the conditional variance
is a weighted sum of past squared innovations, "2
t¡i. This conditional variance
follows an ARCH(p) process as follows:
h
2






Here, the variance of the error term depends on the intercept ﬁ0 and the
weighted average of past squared innovations, where wi are the weighting para-
meters. Using monthly observations12, the ARCH speci…cation has 12 months
lags13 as we assume that information from the past year is useful for predicting
the mean. We discount the older information using a linearly declining weight
scheme where wi = (13¡i)=78, and i = 1¡12. This declining weight scheme on
lag structures also helps cope with the collinearity of the past square innovation
terms,"2
t¡i [see Engle (1982)]. The equation can therefore be written as14
h
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From the speci…cation above (equation (3)-(5)), we can conclude that the
conditional mean of the excess holding yield E (yt) depends on the conditional
standard deviation of the unforecastable error term. Given that the variation
of return measures riskiness, as Et¡1yt = „t; the risk premium is an increasing
function of the conditional standard deviation of the returns.
The model speci…cation above is used to generate risk premia for our entire
sample.
12ELR use quarterly formulation and use four lags.
13The conditional variance follows a 12-order autoregressive process.
14We use monthly data and assume that the useful information for predicting the mean
comes from the past year. Thus, in the conditional variance equation, we specify the declining
weight on lag structure of past square innovations as in equation (7). However, Engle, Lilien,
















This section describes characteristics of the dependent variable, the risk premia
and the explanatory variables.
4.1 Dependent variable: Risk premia
This section describes the risk premia data which is the dependent variable
in the cross section regression and the panel data analysis sections. The risk
premia generated from volatility of excess holding yield is referred to as the ex-
post term premia or liquidity premia since the excess holding yield represents
the realised or expost premium from holding the long-term as compared to
short-term securities.
In this section, we present the estimation of the risk premia for 43 countries
derived from the ARCH-M model. The estimated risk premia (together with the
excess holdingyield) are presented in …gures 1.1 to1.43. This is to illustrate their
characteristics over time and across countries. We …rst provide some descriptive
statistics of the estimated risk premia.
Table 2.3 gives descriptive statistics of the risk premia of 6 month versus 3
month treasury bills across the sample period of 1994-2006. …gure 2.1 shows
average risk premia over the period of 1994-2006 for all 43 countries. The table
and …gures show that the risk premia is highest in the Philippines. The risk
premia here are also highly volatile with standard deviation of 0.58, and with
average risk premium of 1.98 percent annually.
In the Latin American countries, the risk premia are highly volatile with
standard deviations between 0.52 (Mexico) to 1.94 (Uruguay). The risk premia
is relatively low in almost all European countries and the series are much less
volatile. Excluding the Czech Republic, the average risk premia in the EU ranges
from 0.06 to 0.27 percent annually with standard deviations ranging from 0.10
18to 0.23. Hence, there seems to be a relationship between economic as well as
…nancial development and the risk premia.
Table 3.1 illustrates estimated coe¢cients and their t-statistics for each of
the 43 countries. The notation of parameters corresponds to equations (3) and
(4). The results from table 3.1 can be summarised as follows. Firstly, there
is an ARCH in mean relationship in 16 out of the 43 countries. The ARCH
in mean relationship exists when the disturbances are heteroscedastic and the
standard deviation of each observations is found to a¤ect signi…cantly the mean
of that observation (ﬁ1 6= 0 and – 6= 0). Additionally, the ARCH-M coe¢cient
shows the correct sign (– > 0) in 34 out of the 41 countries; the risk premia is
an increasing function of the conditional variance of returns15.
Secondly, from the result of ARCH-M estimation in table 3.1, the conditional
variance of ARCH (12) process is constant (i.e. ﬁ1 = 0 and thus – = 0) in China,
Hungary, Indonesia, Korea, and Sri Lanka. The models show relatively ‡at and
less volatile risk premia in Indonesia and Sri Lanka as are illustrated in …gures
1.19 and 1.26, respectively. However, this does not imply that the risk premia
of government assets in these countries are constant.
From the plots of the excess holding yields and estimated risk premia, the
series of excess holding yield in these …ve countries are so noisy16 that a sys-
tematic pattern of conditional heteroscedasticity does not hold given the quite
short time-horizon under consideration. Thus, the conditional variance cannot
be predicted by the past squared innovations as is suggested by Engle, et. al.
(1987). We also …nd that the excess return series shows extreme volatility in
15We can conduct the sign test to see whether there is a signi…cant positive relationship
between the risk premia and the conditional variance of return. The null hypothesis to be
tested here is that there is no signi…cant positive relationship between them. This hypothesis
implies that both the positive and negative of – in equation (4) are equally likely to be larger
than the other. The results show zero p-value, which indicates that there is a strong positive
relationship between the risk premia and the volatility [ Pr ( k >= 34) = 0.000013, Pr ( k
<= 34) = 0.999998, given N=41, k=34 ].
16There is no variation in volatility of the excess holding yield. In other words, the series
are constantly highly-volatile.
19Hungary (Figure 1.18) and Korea(Figure 1.25). The excess return swings wildly
(with periods of both negative and positive excess return) without any system-
atic pattern in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. We cannot …nd information for the risk
premia in China (Figure 1.8) and Slovak Republic (Figure 1.36). Again, this
can be attributes to the short horizon of the observations in China and Slovak
Republic. (see table 1.1 for data appendix)
Lastly, for some countries, although the disturbance is heteroscedastic(ﬁ1 6= 0)
, the data are not suggestive of an ARCH-M process i.e. the conditional standard
deviation does not a¤ect the mean. These countries are Norway, Sweden, Fin-
land, Greece, Ireland, Turkey, South Africa, Argentina, Uruguay, Israel, Hong
Kong and Hungary. From …gures, there is no period of stability in the excess
holding yield in any of these countries. Hence, the estimated risk premium
is characterised by a relatively ‡at line. Good examples here are the excess
holding return series in Sweden, South Africa, Israel and Ireland. In Sweden,
the variance of the excess return is very stable as illustrated in Figure 1.37.
The excess return series in South Africa (see Figure 1.43) ‡uctuates around
the constant mean with a brief shock in 1998. In Ireland, the excess return is
also volatile throughout (see Figure 1.21). The excess return in Israel is severely
volatile around the constant mean (see Figure 1.22), the series distributed evenly
between positive and negative values. This re‡ects a fairly unstable …nancial
condition in this country. The risk premia is unsurprisingly high throughout.
The problem therefore is that the time period under consideration is not long
enough to observe both periods of stability and volatility e.g. Engle, et. al.
(1987) look at the risk premia in USA during 1960-1985, wherein there is a
period of stability followed by a volatile period. In order to …nd an ARCH-M
process, the samples must contain both.
The excess holding yield in some other countries swings unsystematically
20and the past innovation does not contain information of the risk premia such as
Turkey and Uruguay (see Figure 1.39 and 1.41). For Argentina (see Figure 1.1),
there is too large shock in 2001 following period of stability, thus it mimics the
predictive ability of the past innovations. Similarly, surrounded by periods of
stability in excess holding yield, there is a large shock 1997-1998 in Hong Kong
(see Figure 1.17) according to the Asian …nancial crisis.
In Finland, there is anegativetime trend during late20th century (see Figure
1.14). The mean and variance of the excess return are trending downward over
the period of studies. On the other hand, there is no trend in the excess return
in Greece and Norway, but the series is highly volatile that the risk premia is
unpredictable.
As mentioned above, there is a signi…cant ARCH in mean relationship in
26 countries (ﬁ1 > 0 and – > 0) in our study. The characteristics of the excess
return is quite similar to the case of the USA during 1960-1985. From Engle,
et. al. (1987)’s work, over the period of analysis there are a few interesting
shocks in the US economy. There was an oil price shock in 1973 and 1980, and
the severe economic recessions in early 1982. During these periods, there was
instability in …nancial and economic conditions, and people lost con…dence in
the assets markets. They were unable to forecast future returns and demanded
more return from holding long-term assets. The volatility in the excess holding
yield produces a higher risk premium in these periods, However, during the
more stable period (1960-1967), we …nd that the risk premium is quite low and
the long run value of the excess return is constant. In our work, the excess
returns of 6 month treasury bills in France (Figure 1.15), Mexico (Figure 1.27),
Malaysia (Figure 1.28), New Zealand (Figure 1.31) follow the same pattern as
the USA case in Engle, et. al. (1987): there is a period of tranquility followed
by a period of volatility. Brazil (Figure 1.5) also follows this pattern, but the
21volatility in the excess holding return is more drastic.
In Australia (Figure 1.2), Austria (Figure 1.3), Belgium (Figure 1.4), Czech
Republic (Figure 1.10), the excess holding return is characterised by a negative
time trend in short run (during late 20th century) and ‡uctuates around the
constant mean in the long run. In Spain (Figure 1.13), the mean of excess
return ‡uctuates up and down but the variances have large swing. There are
time trends in the excess return and its variance is not constant throughout
the period of studies with shocks in some periods in Germany (Figure 1.11),
Switzerland (Figure 1.7), Canada (Figure 1.6), Colombia (Figure 1.9), Denmark
(Figure 1.12), India (Figure 1.20).
Figures 1.1-1.4 illustrates the average risk premia for all 43 countries over
the period of 1994-2006. Figure 2.1 is the average risk premia for holding 6
month treasury bills (comparing to 3-month treasury bills). Figure 2.2 is the
average risk premia for holding 12 month treasury bills (comparing to 3-month
treasury bills). The purpose of …gure 2.2 is to show that the di¤erence in average
risk premia across countries is consistent across maturities. We …nd that the
risk premia is generally low in countries with better …nancial development and
economics conditions. Government assets in Singapore,Australia and Japan
are relatively less risky compared to other countries in the study. Government
assets in the Philippines and all Latin American countries are considered to be
more risky than the rest. We can also perform country comparison of the risk
premia by considering the countries’ income and economic development. Figure
3.1 presents risk premia (for holding 6 month treasury bills) comparisons by
country group. We …nd that the risk premia of government assets in the non-
OECD countries are relatively higher than the OECD country group. Figure
3.2 presents risk premia (for holding 6 month treasury bills) comparisons by
country’s income. The higher income countries have relatively safer government
22assets.
From a rough comparison of risk premia in 43 countries in this study. It is
useful to extend an analysis by doing the cross section and panel data analy-
sis. We examine whether the country’s macroeconomic variables a¤ect the risk
premia in section 5 and 6.
4.2 Explanatory variables:
This section de…nes our control and explanatory variables used in the risk premia
regression and discusses the expected sign of relationships with the risk premia.
The macroeconomic variables we examine are economic growth (GGDP), the
in‡ation rate (INFL), the real e¤ective exchange rate (REER), and the volatil-
ity of real e¤ective exchange rate, (V REER). The government …scal variables
pertain to government debt as a percentage of GDP (DEBTGDP) and the …s-
cal de…cit as a percent of GDP (DEFGDP) : The institutional variables consist
of political constraints (POLCON5) and a political risk index (ICRG) : These
variables will be de…ned subsequently. The sources and de…nition of data are
detailed in the data appendix in table 1.2.
A preliminary examination of these relationships is presented by using the
bar charts of the explanatory variables and bivariate regression plots of the
risk premia and explanatory variables. The bar charts of average value of each
explanatory variables are presented in …gures 4.1-4.9. The bivariate regression
plots of the mean value of country’s risk premia and explanatory variables are
presented in …gures 5.1-5.9.
The initial income level (GDP94) is our control variable for di¤erences in
initial development levels. The initial level of income is derived from the natural
log of real gross domestic product per capita in year 1994 of each country. Initial
income also be a proxy for the …nancial development. We might expect that
23there is less risk premia in holding government assets in countries with higher
initial income and better …nancial development.
To control for heterogeneity among groups of economies, the regression
analysis also include 3 groups of dummies, namely, EMU, NEMU_RICH
and POOR . The dummy variable EMU stands for member countries of the
European Monetary Union (EMU). We can refer to these countries as the Eu-
rozone17. The second dummy variable, N EMU_RICH stands for other high
income countries outside the Eurozone such as Denmark, Sweden, United King-
dom18, USA, Canada, Japan, etc. Lastly, the dummy variable POOR stands
for the low to middle income countries such as Czech Republic, Slovak Republic,
Hungary, Poland19, Malaysia and Thailand, etc. The partitioning of these three
groups is presented in the variable list in table 2.1. The de…nition of high/low
income countries is obtained from the World Bank (2006). Using dummy vari-
ables also allow us to compare these 3 countries groups in the regression analysis.
We discuss the reason for adding these three dummy variables in paragraphs
below.
In our context, the inclusion of a Euro-zone dummy variable could be par-
ticularly relevant. The in‡ation and exchange rate risk associated with their
government assets are closely aligned, given their common currency. We begin
our analysis in 1994 which is the second stage of the implementation of the
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)20. At this stage, economic
17The Eurozone (also called Euro Area, Eurosystem or Euroland) is the subset of European
Union member states which have adopted the euro, creating a currency union. The European
Central Bank is responsible for the monetary policy within the eurozone.
18Denmark, Sweden and the UK are countries in the European Union that do not use the
Euro.
19Czech republic, Slovak republic, Hungary and Poland joined the EMU on 1 May 2004.
However, we do not include them in the group of Eurozone due to the ealrly stage of mem-
bership and their income level.
20The …rst stage on the EMU (started on 1 July 1990) was to provide complete freedom
for capital transactions, to improve economic convergence and to raise co-operation between
central banks. There was also a free use of the European Currency Unit (a forerunner of the
Euro currency). [European Central Bank, 2006]
The second stage (1 January 1994) is to strangthen co-ordination and economic convergence,
24convergence criteria among member countries had been in process, although
the o¢cial launch of the euro was not until 1 January 1999. The EMU had a
major impact on the European …nancial markets and the management of the
economic policies. It was argued that the currency risk would be reduced fol-
lowing EMU. Government assets will instead be subjected just to the default
risk.
"Government assets among EMU member countries would mainly
di¤er with respect to their credit worthiness, liquidity and tax treat-
ment since intra-EMU exchange risk should be zeroand in‡ation risk
would be the same for every country in the Euro zone" [Lemmen and
Goodhart, 1999].
Thus the principal source of relative risk in government debt markets in
EMU is credit risk. The variation in interest rates and exchange rates, which
we regard as the market risk is no longer involved at least in intra-EMU [IBCA,
1996]. We thus may expect no signi…cant di¤erence between the exchange rate
and in‡ation risk among EMU member countries in our regression21.
Basically, the initial income and these dummies are similarly functioning
as control variables. They are employed to control for the …nancial develop-
ment in general. The countries’ initial incomes take the economic covergence
into account when we measure the economic growth. The dummy variables help
enhance the predictability of the model by taking into account the income di¤er-
ence and the in‡ation and exchange rate agreements22. An interesting research
toestablishEuropean Monetary Institute and tofoster the process leading totheindependence
of the national central bank.
The last stage (1 Jan 1999) is to o¢cially introduce Euro, to conduct the single monetary
policy by theEuropena System of Central Banks and entryintoe¤ect of the intra-EU exchange
rate mechanism (ERM II) and into force of the Stability and Growth pact.
21We note that, however, the exchange rate risk still exists externally. The EMU member
that trades externally has more risk than a member that does not i.e. it depends on extent
of external trade.
22Including income dummies tends to enhance the predictability of the model. Figure 3.4A
25question is to examine whether EMU member countries have lower risk premia
as a result of their exchange rate arrangement. This issue will be unfolded in
cross section and panel data analysis section.
Next, we discuss the characteristics of the explanatory variables. Countries
with superior macroeconomic conditions, less exchange rate volatility, better
…scal conditions and more reliable political conditions, are expected to have
lower risk premia. The superior macroeconomic conditions are characterised by
low in‡ation rate and high output growth. The government will have a good
…scal condition if it has low debt and budget de…cit in proportion with the gross
domestic product. The political conditions are relatively more reliable if there
is less political risk in the country and more stable government policy.
The percentage increase in gross domestic product (GDP) during one year





The GDP data are available on a quarterly basis. GGDPit is the rate of change
in the gross domestic product of country i at quarter t comparing to the same
quarter last year, t ¡ 4. In the risk premia regression, we use the natural log
of the average GDP growth of each particular country over 1994 to 2006 as an
explanatory variable. We expect that a good economic performance comes along
with stable …nancial market conditions. Alternatively slow economic growth
might make the government asset in that country be more risky.
The GDP growth data suggests that there tends to be convergence across
the economies in our sample. Figure 4.2 is bar chart of economic growth on
average over 1994-2006. It suggests that lower income or developing countries
(labelled by POOR) experience signi…cantly higher growth rates than the higher
and 3.4B show that countries with high incomes tend to have lower risk premia. We partially
control for income by using dummy variables, NEMU_RICH and POOR.
26income group (labelled by EMU and NEMU_RICH). Comparing this …gure
with the bar chart of each country’s initial level of income measured by the
gross domestic product in 1994 (…gure 4.1), it suggests that the less advanced
economies with lower value of initial income (and initial capital) have higher
growth rate of income (and capital).
In the bivariate regression in …gure 5.1, there is a strongly negative relation-
ship between initial level of income (GDP 94) and the risk premia as suggested
earlier. On the other hand, the bivariate regression in …gure 5.2 show a strongly
positive relationship between the risk premia and economic growth. This rela-
tionship is somewhat contradict to our prior that the better economic growth
leads to less risk premia required. Referring back to the chart of average risk
premia over 1994-2006 (…gures 2.1 and 2.2), the estimated risk premia for the
developing countries are quite high. However, during this period the more back-
ward economies have higher economic growth rate than developed countries as
suggested by the convergence. This shows the importance of including the initial
level of income variable to control for other factors determining the risk premia
apart from the economic growth.
In‡ation is also a potential determinant of risk premia. Investors protect
themselves by requiring nominal interest rates that compensate them for ex-
pected in‡ation as well as for the risk that the in‡ation deviates from their
expectations. The higher prices rise, the lower will be the purchasing power of
the principal and nominal interest payments correspondingly must be higher.
Not only do investors want to be compensated for the in‡ation they expect, they
also want to be compensated for the risk that in‡ation could increase during
the term of their loan. In‡ation (INF L) is de…ned as the percentage change
of consumer price index over the corresponding period of previous year. In the
cross section regression, we use the natural log of the mean in‡ation for each
27country over 1994-2006. We expect a positive relationship between the in‡ation
rate and the risk premia.
The datasuggest that the attempt to stabilise in‡ation among member coun-
tries in EMU seems to be successful. This can be seen in the charts of average
country’s in‡ation over 1994-2006 in …gure 4.3. Within the Eurozone (exclud-
ing Greece23), the country’s average in‡ation over the period varies between the
minimum value of 1.88 percent24 in France to maximum value of 4.89 percent
in Italy (excluding Greece, the mean in‡ation of this group is 2.83 percent).
As mentioned earlier, the in‡ation levels of the Eurozone members tend not
to be di¤erent from each others possibly due to the single currency convergence
criteria. The higher income countries (both inside and outside Eurozone) have
lower in‡ation rate than the lower income group. Comparing in‡ation level
between countries in EMU and NEMU_RICH, the di¤erence between these
2 groups is not obvious25. However, there is slightly higher variation in in‡ation
rates in the latter group. The developing countries group (P OOR) has highest
levels of in‡ation and the variation of in‡ation rates is quite substantial.
The scatter plots illustrating the relationship between risk premia and the
in‡ation are presented in …gure 5.3. From the …gure, the EMU members are
clustered around one another. The majority of countries in the POOR group
are more dispersed in terms of both the risk premia and in‡ation. Overall,
the …tted line shows a clear upward trend, which re‡ects a strongly positive
relationship between the risk premia and the level of in‡ation. The t statistics
from the single regression in both …gures are signi…cant at the 1% level.
23The average in‡ation over 1994-2006 of Greece is 8.21 percents which is substaintially
higher than the rest of countries in the Eurozone . This is partly because Greece if the last
country that join this group. Greece was quali…ed as an EMU memeber state in 2000 and was
admitted on 1 January 2001.
24In the cross section regression, we use the natural log of this value instead.
25Additionally, we …nd that the mean in‡ation in the UK, Denmark and Sweden are not
very much di¤erent from the Eurozone (see …gure 4.5). This is reasonable. These three
countries are reluctant the to join the Eurozone on political ground, it is not because these
three countries have problem qualifying for membership.
28The real e¤ective exchange rate (REER) provides a measure of a country’s
competitive position over time by taking the e¤ect of price movements into
account26. Movements in real e¤ective exchange rates provide an indication of
the evolution of a country’s aggregate external price competitiveness since it
measures the currency’s appreciation/depreciation against a weighted basket of
foreign currencies and adjusts for relative prices between countries. The goods
and services produced in particular country may not …nd buyers in both foreign
and domestic markets if there is a fall in competitiveness. An improvement/fall
in international price competitiveness a¤ects the country’s international trade
position, national production, employment and income. We might expect that a
rise in the REER (a fall in international competitiveness) results in an economic
contraction as suggested in the Mundell-Fleming model. This in turn might be
expected to be associated with a rise in the risk premia for holding government
bonds in that country.
We also link real e¤ective exchange rate volatility (VREER) to the risk
premia of government treasury bills. We measure real exchange rate volatility
as the natural log of the standard deviation of the real e¤ective exchange rate
over 1994-2006. Using monthly data (t) of REER in country i, we de…ne the
annual standard deviation of the real e¤ective exchange rate as










26To explain the concept of real e¤ective exchange rate, we …rst refer to the real exchange
rate. The real exchange rate is the nominal exchange rate adjusted for relative prices between




where Ereal is the index of the real e¤ective exchange rate, E is the nominal exchange rate
(foreign currency per unit of domestic currency) in index form, P is the index of the domestic
price level, and P¤ is the index of the foreign price level. Instead of using a single foreign
currency, the real e¤ective exchange rate is concerned with what is happening to it against a
basket of foreign currencies with whom the country trades.[Pilbeam, 1998, pp.13-16]
29In this analysis, more volatile real e¤ective exchange rates implies more un-
certainty in the country’s competitiveness position. Thus, we would expect a
positive relationship between real e¤ective exchange rate volatility and the risk
premium.
Di¤erences in the country’s competitive position, as measured by the real
e¤ective exchange rate (REER), between the three countries groups is less clear-
cut in the data. The charts of the country’s average real e¤ective exchange rate
over 1994-2006 are presented in …gure 4.4. On the other hand, the exchange
rate volatility (VREER) over the period is generally higher in the P OOR group
than the higher income group (EMU and NEMU_RICH). Additionally, the
majority of countries in the EMU group have relatively lower exchange rate
volatility than the rest. The charts of the real e¤ective exchange rate volatility
are presented in …gure 4.5.
The plots of the relationship between the risk premia and the real e¤ective
exchange rate are presented in …gure 5.4. The impact of the country’s compet-
itive position on the risk premia on holding 6-month treasury bills is unclear.
Figure 5.5 presents data for the relationship between the risk premia and the
volatility of the real e¤ective exchange rate. There is a strongly negative rela-
tionship between the risk premia and the volatility of the real e¤ective exchange
rate which is consistent with our prior. The t statistics from the single regression
is signi…cant at the 1% level.
Government debt as a percentage of gross domestic product can be consid-
ered as a determinant of government default risk. The higher the existing debt
stock to GDP ratios, the greater the debt service obligations and the lower the
government’s capacity to borrow and roll over debt declines. This ultimately
may result in an increase in the risk of default. We thus might expect a positive
relationship between the risk premia and the government debt. The regression
30uses the natural log of the mean government debt as a percentage of GDP over
1994-2006.
An increase in the …scal de…cit might impact the risk premium for two rea-
sons. Firstly, …scal expansion may worsen future public debt and increase the
probability of a debt crisis. Secondly, it a¤ects public trust and investors’ ex-
pectations. The ability to control …scal de…cits reveals information about gov-
ernment preferences, the importance of lobbies (which expect tax cuts or ex-
penditure increases) and the degree of reform implementation (i.e. future public
de…cits.). Hence, we might expect the risk premia is increasing with the gov-
ernment budget de…cit. In the regression, we use the mean of the de…cit as a
percentage of GDP for country i over 1994-2006, DEFGDPi.
The data for government budget de…cit and debt as a percentage of GDP
over 1994-2006 are presented in …gures 4.6 and 4.7. There is not much di¤erent
across the groups. In …gure 4.6, the negative value represents the government
budget de…cit. On average of 1994-2006, majority of sample countries have
government budget de…cit. The exceptions are Ireland, New Zealand, Brazil,
Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, and Slovak Republic, which have government
budget surplus. Due to the high variation among samples, we normalize this
variable by taking the natural log of (1+ 0:1¤ DEFGDPi) in the regression.
A scatter plot of the risk premia and the government budget de…cit data
is presented in …gure 5.6. There is no signi…cant relationship between these
two variables but the sign of the predicted coe¢cient is correct. We suspect,
however, that the budget de…cit does not strongly drive risk due to the existence
of the outliers e.g. Norway, Sri Lanka, India, Philippines and Singapore. We
will leave this issue until the next section.
Figure 5.7 contains data on the risk premia and government debt. The pre-
dicted coe¢cient of government debts is not statistically signi…cant. Surpris-
31ingly, the plots show negative relationship between government debts and the
risk premia. It can be argued that government debts are not always bad. Debts
re‡ect the demand for government assets by investors. The greater demand for
them (given that there is no constraint on the supply side) may also mean that
they are safer bet than private assets or foreign assets. For example, Belgium
and Philippines both have high government debt but the risk premia for holding
securities in the former is less than the latter country. On the other hand, there
are low government debts in Australia and Colombia. Unsurprisingly, the risk
premia in Australia is lower.
The political variables used in this paper are the political risk index created
by the PRS group and the political constraints index (POLCON5) by Henisz
(2002). The political risk index (ICRG) measures the political stability of
countries on a comparable basis. The index is based on 100 points. The higher
number of points indicates lower potential political risk e.g. 80-100 points rep-
resent very low risk and 0-49.5 points represent very high risk. In the political
risk assessment, the number of points depends on the …xed weight of the po-
litical risk components. The political risk components and their weights in the
parentheses are Government stability (12), Socioeconomic Conditions (12), In-
vestment Pro…le (12), Internal Con‡ict (12), External Con‡ict (12), Corruption
(6), Military in Policies (12), Religion in Policies (6), Law and Order (6), Ethnic
Tensions (6), Democratic Accountability (6) and Bureaucracy Quality (4). The
data for ICRG are available annually. In the regression, we take natural logs of
the mean of the political risk index over 1994-2006. We might expect a negative
relationship between ICRG and RP3_6. In other words, lower risk premia for
holding government assets should be positively related to the ICRG rating.
P OLCON5 measures the e¤ective political restrictions on executive behav-
ior. It accounts for the veto powers of the executive whether or not there are,
32two legislative chambers, sub national entities and an independent judiciary.
The index ranges from zero to one, where the higher value indicates stronger
political constraints on the government. We take the natural log of the average
values of POLCON5 over 1994-2006. The stronger political constraint re‡ects a
more stable government policy, which may in turn result in reduced risk premia.
Higher income countries tend to have lower political risk ratings (higher
score) and stronger political constraints than the lower income group, as shown
in …gure 4.8 and 4.9. From the scatter plots in …gures 5.8 and 5.9, the risk
premia exhibit negative correlations with both political variables as expected.
The scatter plot of the risk premia and the political risk rating is presented
in …gure 5.8. The political risk index negatively determines the risk premia as
we expected. The predicted coe¢cient is highly signi…cant (at the 1% level).
The scatter plot of the risk premia and the political constraint is illustrated in
…gure 5.9. The determinant of the political constraint index on the risk premia
is less strong but the sign of the predicted coe¢cient is correct. The predicted
coe¢cient is signi…cant at the 12% level.
The next section is to present the result from the cross section regression
analysis.
5 The cross section regression
This section examines the determinants of risk premia on holding 6-month trea-
sury bills in 43 countries using cross section regression analysis. We test whether
macroeconomic variables, government …scal variables and political variables de-
termine the risk premia. The dependent variable in the regression is the average
risk premia for holding 6-month treasury bills comparing to 3 month treasury
bills (RP3_6) for di¤erent countries over the period 1994-2006 (as depicted
in …gure 2.1). In general, investors who hold these assets are mainly …nancial
33institutions. These …nancial institutions are assumed to minimize investment
risks by spreading assets among di¤erent investments both nationally and inter-
nationally. The di¤erence between these 2 assets is that holding shorter term
treasury bills is less subjected to liquidity risk. In other words, the ability to sell
or convert a security into cash is obviously greater for the shorter term treasury
bills.
A small sample version of heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix
estimator, HC3 proposed by MacKinnon and White (1985)27 is applied to cor-
rect for heteroskedasticity in the cross-sectional data analysis28. The following
subsection are the results of the risk premia cross-section regression on the
macroeconomic and political variables.
We …rst examine the correlations between risk premia and the explanatory
variables across countries. The results are given in table 4.2. To set the nota-
tion, ‰ is the correlation coe¢cient. We notice that the risk premia is highly
correlated with the political risk index (‰ = ¡0:63), the political constraint in-
dex (‰ = ¡0:58) and in‡ation (‰ = 0:57) : Other variables that are fairly corre-
lated with the risk premia are real exchange rate volatility (‰ = 0:50) , economic
growth29 (‰ = 0:43) and the budget de…cit as a percentage of GDP (‰ = ¡0:17).
With the exception of economic growth, the signs of all the correlation coef-
…cients are consistent with our priors corresponding to the previous section.
Knowing that these variables are associated with the risk premia, we might pre-
27Long and Ervin (2000) produced an extensive study of small sample behaviour and arrive
at the conslusion that HC3 provides the best performance in small samples (less than 250
observations) as it gives less weight to in‡uential observaitons.
28When the variance of the errors varies across observaitons, OLS becomes ine¢cient and
the estimates of the standard errors are inconsistent. This result in incorrect inferences. For a
careful dataanalysis, we thus correct for heteroskedasticity in the cross sectional data analysis
by using MacKinnon and White (1985)’s HC3.
29Both In‡ation and economic growth are consirably correlate to the risk premia. How-
ever, the correlation between these two explanatory variables is quite high: In order to avoid
endogeneity problem, we should include both variabls in our equation. We can …nd the de-
terminant of one explanatory variable on risk premia while controlling the impact of another
explanatory variable.
34dict that these variables would be statistically signi…cant predictor variables in
the regression model.
The starting point for the risk premia cross-section regression30 is to regress
the risk premia on the macroeconomic variables, initial level of income and the
country’s economic and income group dummies. The results are presented in
column (1) of table 5. The results show that in‡ation (INFL) and the economic
growth (GGDP ) are signi…cant at the 5% level31. The budget De…cit as a per-
centage of GDP (DEFGDP) has predictive power at the 10% level. Initial level
of income is signi…cant at the 15 percent level. Central government debt as a
percentage of GDP (DEBTGDP) and the real e¤ective exchange rate volatility
(VREER) do not statistically determine the risk premia. Approximately 74%
of the variability of the risk premia is accounted for by the explanatory variables
in the model.
Column (2) adds the political variables, POLCON 5 and ICRG to the
model. The economic factors are robust to the inclusion of additional explana-
tory variables. However, the economic factors highly dominate in the risk premia
regression, thus the political variables have limited explanatory power32. The
sign of the predicted coe¢cients are as expected although are not signi…cant.
We can conclude from the regression in column (2) that the short run macro-
economic circumstances do most of the work in explaining the risk premia e.g.
the higher in‡ation, the lower growth and government de…cit lead to lower risk
premia. In contrast, the level of long run development as illustrated by the
institutional variables, i.e. the political risk index and the political constraint
30The regression is based on the heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix (HCMM)
version HC3 by Mackinnon and White 1985. This helps corerect heteroscedasticity in the
small sample size model (n · 250).
31The magnitude will be presented in the preferred model. It will be discussed in the latter
paragraphs.
32Adding political variables POLCON5 and ICRG seperately into the model in column
(1) of table 5 also does not improve the explanatory power of each political variable in the
regression.
35index, and the public debt do not determine the risk premia. A good example is
Belgium. The average government debt as a percentage of gross domestic prod-
uct over 1994-2006 is high in this country (as illustrated in …gure 4.7). However,
the risk premia for holding government asset is quite low (see …gure 5.7). For
the case of this country, high debt may be a sign that a country is a safe bet.
Column (3) excludes the insigni…cant explanatory variables. The results
from the previous section are unchanged. The e¤ect of the de…cit as a percentage
of GDP,DEF GDP become stronger and is signi…cant at 5% level. The variables
economic growth (GGDP) and in‡ation (IN FL) are once again signi…cant at
the 5% level.33. The standardized coe¢cient (beta value) of this model is also
presented in table 5. It indicates the size of the change in the risk premia, RP36
(in term of its standard deviation) with respect to a one standard deviation in
the explanatory variable. For example, based on the estimates in column (5),
a one standard deviation increase in INFL (from Germany to Portugal’s level)
raises the risk premium by 1.29 of a standard deviation (from Germany to
Indonesia’s level34).
Finally, it is possible that this outlying observations might skew our test for
heteroscedasticity in column (3). We thus identify outliers or in‡uential obser-
vations35. The outliers measure suggests removing observations in Argentina36,
Brazil, Norway, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Philippines and Singapore. We omit these
7 countries from regression in column (3) and present the result in column (4).
33Note that in column (3), omitting DEBTGDP and REER volatility, VREER yields 9
more observations which are Argentina, Brazil, Greece, Mexico, Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia,
Korea and Thailand.
34The rank of countries by the average risk premia for holding 6 month treasury bill (com-
paring to those with 3 month maturity) over 1994 to 2006 can be found in picture 3.1.
35We assess outliers by DFITS measure. The measure combines information on the residual
and leverage.
36Omitting observations from these 7 countries are reasonable. Firstly, there are limited
observations in deriving risk premia for Argentina (from 1998:07-2002:01), Sri Lanka (from
1994:12-2001:01) and Indonesia (1994:12-2001:01). Lastly, the excess holding yield series in
these 7 countries show the statistically insigni…cant ARCH-M. This is partly due to the eco-
nomic crisis which generate large shocks to the excess holding yield series, for example, the
large economic shock in Argentina in 2002.
36Comparing the previous column with the latter, dropping observations reduces
the variation and standard errors of all estimated coe¢cients. Additionally, col-
umn (4) suggests the model does not su¤er from heteroskedasticity (based on
Breusch-Pagan and White tests37) and omitted variable bias (based on Ram-
sey’s RESET statistics)38. Column (4) is thus the preferred model. In this
regression, the power of INFL and DEF GDP becomes stronger and are both
signi…cant at the 1% level. GGDP is once again signi…cant at 5% level. A
one-standard-deviation increase in INFL would raise the risk premia by 71.92
percentage points39 (or a 1.23 standard deviation increase in the predicted risk
premia). Additionally, a one standard deviation increase in an economic growth
would yield a 0.91 standard deviation decrease (or 53% decrease) in the pre-
dicted risk premia. Lastly, a one standard deviation increase in the de…cit as
a percentage of GDP would yield a 0.55 standard deviation increase (or 32.3%
increase) in the predicted risk premia.
The scatter plots of the risk premia regression of the preferred model [column
(4) of table 5] are presented in …gure 5.10. These …gures show scatter plots of
natural log of in‡ation, natural log of government budget de…cit (% GDP) and
economic growth, conditional on the natural log of initial level of income, and
other control variables. All the three explanatory variables are in correct sign
and are statistically signi…cant. Empirically, risk averse investors appear to
require less risk premia for holding government securities in countries with a
sound and stable …nancial market condition, i.e., the lower level of in‡ations
and the government de…cits and higher economic growth. Referreing back to
section 4.2, the bivariate regression plots of risk premia and economic growth
37The test on heteroskedasticity given by the Breusch-Pagan test and the White’s test.
Both test the null hypothesis that the variance of the residuals is homogenous. From table 5,
column (4), there is no evidence against the null hypothesis.
38The omitted variable bias test (ovtest) command performs a regression speci…cation error
test (RESET) for omitted variables under the null hypothesis that model has no omitted
variables. From table 5, column (4), the null hypothesis is not rejected.
39The percentage point is computed from STATA and is not shown in the table.
37(…gure 5.2) suggested a strongly positive relationship between the two variables.
It is interesting to note here that after controlling for the initial level of income,
there is a negative relationship between the risk premia and economic growth as
suggests in section 4.1 above. The regression plots are presented in the upper
right panel of …gure 5.10.
We can alsocompare the scatter plots from a single cross section regression of
risk premia on the DEFGDP (in …gure 5.6) with its conditional plots (in second
picture of …gure 5.10). We observe that after cutting outliers (Argentina, Brazil,
Norway, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Philippines and Singapore), the DEF GDP is
statistically signi…cant in the risk premia regression.
We can also undertake the risk premia analysis by country group from col-
umn (4). Lower income countries40 are estimated to have risk premia about 19
percent41 more than in the high income countries outside the Eurozone, holding
other variables constant. In the high income countries outside the Eurozone,
the risk premia on holding government assets is predicted to be 10 percent more
than those in Eurozone.
The results of the standard cross section regression tell us the relationship
between the risk premia and the macroeconomic and political variable on aver-
age of time during 1994-2006. In the next section, we consider how changes in
the macroeconomic and political variables over time a¤ect the change in the risk
premia over the same time period. This can be done by the panel estimation of
the risk premia.
40In the preferred model ( column 4 of table 5), we include dummy variables EMU and
POOR in the model. The coe¢cient (and t-statistics) of dummy variables are ¡0:10(0:20)
and 0:19(0:38) , respectively.
41The dependent variable (therisk premia) is measured in natural logs, thus we can interpret
the coe¢cients of the dummy variables in percentage.
386 Panel Data Analysis
6.1 Methodology
In this section, we employ panel data analysis to study the behavior and de-
terminants of government asset risk premia in 43 countries over the period
1994-2006. In the panel regression, we examine annual data. The risk premia
and explanatory variables data are annualised by taking average value of the
monthly observations.
In the panel regression analysis, there are 3 critical methodological consid-
erations. Firstly, the panel regression analysis allow us to take into account the
arguments that the risk premia is time varying ( as stated in sections 1 to 4).
Additionally, it accounts for omitted variables and unobserved heterogeneity
by incorporating the …xed country e¤ect into the model. Econometricly, the
Hausman test indicates that the …xed e¤ects model are more suitable for the
data i.e. there is a systematic di¤erence in the coe¢cients between the random
e¤ects and the …xed e¤ects models (p=0.00).
The second methodological consideration concerns how the risk premia is
modelled. Choosing the dynamic panel model by taking the lagged depen-
dent variable as an additional regressor is appealing in econometric sense. The
Augmented Dickey Fuller test reveals that the risk premia RP3_6it series are
persistent and follow a …rst order autoregressive process. Intuitively, the be-
haviour of the current risk premia partly depends on the measured value in the
recent past42. Thus, including the lag dependent variable accounts for partial
adjustment of risk premia behavior over time43.
42Intuitively, people form their expectation about the risk premia in the future for holding
government bonds based on its past. For example, if the risk premia has been higher than
expected in the past, people would revise expectations for the future. This can be referred to
the theory of adaptive expectations.
43According to Warwo (2002), another motivation for including lags would be to account
for exogenous shocks that are believed to have continual e¤ects over time. The coe¢cients on
lagged dependent variables whether these factors have a greater impact over time or whether
39To examine the determinant of the risk premia, the following model is esti-
mated:
yit = ￿yit¡1 + x
0
itﬂ + ·i + –t + †it; (8)
given j￿j < 1;i = 1;:::;N and t = 1;:::;T: Following Bond (2002), we assume





E(†i;t;†j;s) = 0;i 6= j or t 6= s;
E (xi;t;†j;s) = 0;8i;j;t;s:
The term yit is the dependent variable RP3_6it; the risk premia for hold-
ing 6 month treasury bills (compared with 3 month treasury bills). We nor-
malise44 it by taking natural log to (1 + 0:1RP3_6)it: The vector of strictly
exogenous explanatory variables is xit ,which consists of natural log of in‡ation
[ln(1 + 0:1INF L)it] , natural log of real e¤ective exchange rate [ln REERit] and
its annualised standard deviation, the economic growth [GGDPit] , natural log of
debt and de…cit as apercentage of GDP [lnDEBTGDPit and ln(1 + (DEF GDP=30))it ],
natural log of the political risk index [lnICRGit] and the natural log of the po-
their impact decays and the rate at which it decays. Including lags of dependent variables
as regressors is a parsimonious way of accounting for the persistent e¤ects of explanatory
variables in the past and can also help eliminate serial correlaitons in the disturbance term
(Beck and Katz, 1996).
44Since there is high variation in the samples, the risk premia data and other explanatory
variables are normalised to correct the data for the relatively favourable and unfavourable
economic conditions and other in‡uences, which a¤ect the risk premia di¤erence among coun-
tries. The normalisation is implemented by taking natural log to the variables. However, some
observations are characterised by the negative value such as risk premia (minimum value is
-1.94), in‡ation rate (minimum value is -3.96) and de…cit as a percentage of GDP (minimum
value is -20.79), thus the remedy is to take natural log to (1+0.1RP36), (1+0.1INFL) and
(1+(DEFGDP/30)).
40litical constraint index [ln POLCONit]: The time e¤ect is –t :The unobserved
individual and time invariant country’s …xed e¤ect is ·i: †it is an unobserved
white noise disturbance. The subscripts i and t represent country and annually
observed time period from 1994-2006, respectively.
The last methodological consideration concerns the choice of estimators to
accommodate the joint presence of dynamics and unobserved heterogeneity in
individual countries. We employ Bruno’s (2005) bias-corrected least squares
dummy variable (LSDVC) approach to model the risk premia. The rationale
for using this estimator over the rests is presented in the following paragraphs.
Although the autoregressive panel data model helps account for dynamic
partial adjustment of the dependent variable, it also introduces bias into the
model (Nickell, 1981 and Bond, 2002). According to the standard results for
omitted variable bias, the OLS estimator of ￿ is inconsistent and biased upwards
since the lagged dependent variable is positively correlated with the error term
due to the presence of the …xed e¤ects. The Within group estimator (LSDV) is
instead biased downwards in case of small T panel even when N is large (Bond,
2002). This is because the within group transformation induces a correlation
between the transformed lagged dependent variable and the transformed error
term in the case of small time period data (Nickell, 1981). In this study the time
dimension of the panel is small (T = 11) thus estimating the least square dummy
variable model with a lagged dependent variable results in biased estimates. In
estimating the dynamic panel data model, Judson and Owen (1999) found that
the bias of the LSDV can be large even when T = 20.
The candidate consistent estimator will lie between the OLS and LSDV
estimates. In previous literature, the …rst di¤erence-IV estimators (Anderson
and Hsiao, 1981 and 1982), the General Method of Moments (GMM) estima-
tors (Arellano 1989; Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995) and
41system GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998) are usually applied to solve the …rst
order dynamic panel data models. However, these methods are only e¢cient
asymptotically and thus are not suitable for small sample data. Bruno (2005)
pointed out that the weakness of these estimators is that their properties hold
for large N, so they can be severely biased and imprecise in panel data with a
small number of cross-sectional units, such as most macro panels.
A method for implementing the corrected least square dummy variable (LS-
DVC) gained popularity in recent literature and was introduced by Kiviet (1995
and 1999) for balanced panels. Bruno (2005) extended the LSDVC estimation
to unbalanced panels with a strictly exogenous selection rule. The LSDVC o¤ers
a method to correct the bias in LSDV estimator for samples where N is small or
only moderately large. The Montecarlo evidence in Judson and Owen (1999)45
showed that the LSDVC estimator is preferred to the GMM estimators when N
is small or only moderately large. This argument is supported by Kiviet (1995)
and Bun and Kiviet (2001).
There are three consistent estimators available to initialise the bias correction
in the LSDVC estimation, which are as follows. The …rst one is the Anderson
and Hsiao estimator (AH), with the dependent variable lagged twice used as an
instrument for the …rst di¤erence model with no intercept. The second estimator
is a standard one step Arellano and Bond’s estimator (AB) with no intercept.
Lastly, the standard Blundell and Bond estimator (BB) with no intercept. Con-
sidering the nature of the risk premia data in this study, the AH estimator is
chosen to initialise the correction procedure. The data are characterised by
small cross section observations, the BB estimator tend to perform badly since
45Judson and Owen (1999) use an RMSE criterion to evaluate di¤erent techniques for es-
timating dynamic panel models in macroeconomic balanced panel datasets. The study found
that for panels of all sizes, a corrected LSDV (LSDVC) is the most preferred estimator since
it generally has the lowest RMSE compared with OLS, LSDV, GMM (both one-step and two-
step estimators by Arellano and Bond, 1991), Instrumental variables (by Anderson and Hsiao;
1981) estimators.
42BB impose more instrument and more moment conditions. The AB estimator
performs better than AH if the estimated coe¢cient of the lagged dependent
variable, ￿ (equation (8) ) in the LSDV estimation is persistent. However, from
table 7.1 columns (3) and (4), ￿ is only approximately 0.26 in this study. Thus
the AH estimator is the best choice46. Additionally, the statistical signi…cance
of the LSDVC coe¢cients has been tested using bootstrapped standard errors
(with 200 iterations).
It is useful to point out that in the corrected least square dummy variable
(LSDVC), Kiviet’s bias correction assumes strict exogeneity in the explanatory
variables, xit: If the the explanatory variables are not strictly exogenous, the bias
correction term is invalid47. In the risk premia measures, there is one concern
about the exogeneity of the right hand side variables i.e. economic growth,
GGDPt
48. We can do a robustness check for the correct LSDV estimators by
implementing Instrumental Variables estimation of the …xed e¤ects panel data
models (IV-FE), allowing possibility of endogenous regressors. The rest of the
variables are treated as strictly exogenous.
We perform instrumental variables regression (or two stage least squares) to
estimate the structural model for the risk premia, RP 36t ( equation (8) ). In
the structural model, RP36 is the endogenous dependent variable, GGDPt is
an endogenous regressor, and the rest are exogenous variables. The …rst stage
regression is modelled as
GGDPt = ﬁ + ﬂ 1DUBIt + ﬂ2DUBI2
t + ﬂ3Yt + vi;t (9)
46However, we note that based on the …nding by Kiviet and Bun (2001), di¤erences in the
initial estimators have only a marginal impact on the LSDVC performance.
47Huang (2005) correct the weakness of this methodology by using the lag of explanatory
variables instead in the regression. However, this case cannot be applied to the risk premia
measures. Intuitively, the risk premia is sensitive and reacts quickly to the shock in macro-
economic circumstances.
48If the GGDP varible is proved to be endogenous, it is more proper to apply instumental
variable regression. The limitation of the Kiviet’s correction in the LSDVC measures is that
it does not allow instruments.
43where DUBIt is the natural log of crude oil price49 (Arab Gulf Dubai) in US
dollars per barrel, DUBI2
t is the square of natural log of crude oil price and Yt
is the real Gross Domestic Product per capita relative to the United States50.
We postulate that economic growth variable (GGDPt) is a function of DUBIt,
DUBI2
t , and Yt: The variable Yt re‡ects the degree of economic convergence.
The change in oil price has short run impact51 on the economy. A signi…cant
increase in oil price can slow down the economic growth in oil importer countries
through its e¤ects on spending, or aggregate demand. It also simultaneously
create in‡ationary pressures through increased prices of oil products used by
consumers, such as gasoline and heating oil and prices of alternatives such as
natural gas. Thus GGDPt is expected to have signi…cant negative relationships
with the oil price. The nonlinear relationships are examined as well. GGDPt
is also expected to have inverse relationship with the economic convergence
variable, Yt. The country’s real output relative to the United States implies the
rate at which the economy catch up the United States. Countries with lower
GDP per capita relative to the United States are expected to grow signi…cantly
faster than rich countries and they tend to catch up or converge to those with
higher real per capita output in a faster speed.
The reason for introducing IV-FE as a robustness check estimator instead of
being the best estimator is that the IV-FE estimator also has a weakness. Its
properties hold for large number of cross sectional units (N), so it can be bi-
49The oil price data are obtained from Datastream, 2006.
50The current per capitaGDP expressed relative to the United states (US=100) is obtained
from the Penn World Table, 2006.
51Under the assumption that the oil prices do not increase sharply and become higher than
their already high levels, their long run e¤ect can be manageable. The impact of higher oil
prices in the long run is that they possibly reduce the production capacity. However, dealing
with the higher oil price in the long run can take place in many ways such as developing
alternative energy sources and conserving the oil. Moreover, productivity gains from diverse
sources, including technological improvements and a more highly educated workforce, are
likely to exceed by a signi…cant margin the productivity losses created by high oil prices
(Bernanke, 2004).
44ased and imprecise in panel data with small number of N, such as most macro
panels including this work. In conclusion, the Kiviet corrections address the
problem of small sample bias, but it is invalid if there is endogeneity problem.
In contrast, the IV can correct the endogeneity, but it is problematic in the
small cross sectional samples. The rationale for choosing best estimators here
is to compare the results of the IV-FE and the …xed e¤ect regressions (LSDV).
If the estimated coe¢cients and standard errors are not systematically di¤er-
ent, we can emphasise the Kiviet approach based on the bias correction of the
LSDV estimator. Then the initial guess that the economic growth variable is
endogenous is proved to be invalid as it does not change the results in the …xed
e¤ect estimations.
In the next section, we present the results of the risk premia regression
using OLS, LSDV, IV-FE and LSDVC estimators. In the OLS, IV-FE and
LSDV estimators, the standard errors computed are asymptotically robust to
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The results will be presented in ag-
gregate and subgroup estimates. The subgroup is determined by the country’s
income level. Topick up unobserved time e¤ects, year dummies (–t) are included
in all regressions in this study.
6.2 The Regression results
6.2.1 Whole sample results
The panel regression results for the whole sample are presented in table 7.1,
including estimation by OLS, LSDV,IV-FE and LSDVC.Estimated p-values are
given in parentheses below point estimates of parameters. For each estimation
procedure, the …rst column is the baseline speci…cation. In these, we control
for the impact of macroeconomic variables in the risk premia regression. In the
second column, we add political variables to the baseline model.
45The results from the pooled regression (OLS) [in columns (1) and (2)] and the
LSDV or the dynamic …xed e¤ects estimator [columns (3) and (4)] are presented
for comparisons with the result from the best estimates, LSDVC [(columns (7)
and (8)]. Before discussing the result from the LSDVC estimates, we check the
robustness of this measures by IV-FE.
The risk premia regression by IV-FE can be presented by columns (5) and
(6). We test the validity of instruments in equation (9) by the Sargan-Hansen
test for overidentifying restriction. The results does not reject the null hypoth-
esis that the instruments (DUBIt, DUBI2
t , and Yt) in equation (9) are valid
instruments. (p-value =0.973 and 0.960 in models in columns (6) and (7), re-
spectively). Thus the instruments are indeed exogenous and correctly excluded
from the estimated equation. We also perform the Anderson (1984) canonical
correlations test. It is a likelihood ratio test of whether the equation is identi-
…ed, i.e. that the excluded instruments are relevant, meaning correlated with
the endogenous regressors. We reject the null hypothesis that the equation is
underidenti…ed (p-value =0.00 in both models in columns (6) and (7)). Thus,
it indicates that the model is identi…ed.
We then compare the coe¢cients of parameter in LSDV and IV-FE regres-
sions. The results suggest the e¤ect of the economic growth is weaker after being
instrumented. However, the resulting coe¢cients of the lag dependent variables
and the explanatory variables, and the standard error in both measures are
unchanged. We employ the Hausman test allow us to check whether there is
a su¢cient di¤erence between the coe¢cients of the instrumental variables re-
gression (IV-FE) and those of the standard …xed e¤ect (LSDV). The Hausman
test clearly indicates that the di¤erence in coe¢cients between the IV-FE and
the FE is not systematic (the null hypothesis that di¤erent in coe¢cients is
not systematic is accepted with ￿2(7) = 0.45 and prob. > ￿2= 0.9996). This
46suggests that we can emphasise on the results of the LSDVC estimates. We can
now proceed the analysis of the estimated results from the preferred estimators,
LSDVC.
The estimated results from the LSDVC are as follows. First, the estimated
coe¢cients of the lagged dependent variable estimated by LSDVC lie between
the OLS and LSDV estimates as proposed in the methodology section.
Secondly, greater real e¤ective exchange rate volatility (V REER) and re-
duced economic growth (GGDP ) are strongly suggestive of increased the risk
premia for holding government’s short term assets (RP 36). In both the baseline
(column 7) and the second model (column 8) speci…cations, the real exchange
rate volatility (V REER) is highly a signi…cant determinant of the risk premia
and is signi…cant at 1% level. The results are robust across the OLS and LSDV
estimates in columns (1)-(4). In both the baseline speci…cation and the second
model of the LSDVC estimates, the coe¢cients of the volatility of real e¤ective
exchange rate (VREER) in the risk premia (RP36) regression is 0.01. The
interpretation is that as V REER increases by 1 unit, RP36 rises by 0.0372
percent anually.
Economic growth (GGDP ) signi…cantly determines the risk premia (RP36)
at 7 percent and 5 percent levels in the…rst and second models, respectively. The
results are consistent with the LSDV estimates. The coe¢cients of economic
growth (GGDP ) in the risk premia (RP36) regressions are -0.461 and -0.481
in the baseline speci…cations and in the second model of LSDVC estimates,
respectively. In the baseline speci…cation, as the economic growth increase by 1
percent annually52, the risk premia decline by 1.4642 percent annually. In the
52We calculate the economic growth variable by initially using the quarterly data. The
economic growth at quarter t is GGDPt: The unit of growth is percent quarterly. It is de…ned
as (lnGDPt ¡ lnGDPt¡4)=4:This is to avoid the seasonal e¤ects. Thus, this method is to
calculate the economic growth by comparing GDP at particular quarter this year with GDP
at the same quarter next year. To convert to annual data, we average GDP growth of each
quarter within a year.
47second model, the risk premia decline by 1.5442 percent annually with respect
to 1 percent increase in the economic growth.
The …nding that economic growth has an important explanatory role for the
dynamics of the yield curve corresponds to the work of Ang and Piazzesi (2003)
who proposed that the variance decompositions show that macro factors explain
up to 85% variation in bond yields53 and Hordahl, Tristani and Vestin (2004).
It is interesting note that the coe¢cient of the economic growth factor is
not statistically signi…cant in the OLS regressions (columns (1) and (2) in table
7.1). However, the coe¢cient is statistically signi…cant in estimates which apply
…xed country e¤ects. Referring back to …gure 4.2 and 5.2, countries with high
average risk premia are growing faster perhaps due to convergence. In contrast,
countries with low risk premia have lower economic growth rate. The economic
growth rates thus correlate with the …xed country e¤ects. For example, the USA
assets have low risk because of …nancial development and economic stability.
However, the economic growth rate of USA is not as high as in Mexico which is
less …nancially developed. The OLS regressions failto distinguish theassociation
of the low risk and low growth countries, it thus bias coe¢cients of the economic
growth in the risk premia regression back down to zero. This explains why the
coe¢cients of GGDP are not statistically signi…cant in the OLS regression. In
contrast, …xed e¤ect estimation distinguishes institutional features of high and
low income countries. Fixed e¤ect estimation allows the in‡uence of economic
growth on the risk premia, holding country e¤ects constant.
A key …nding is a strong statistical relationship between exchange rate
volatility (V REER) and risk premia (RP36). Intuitively, the asset invest-
53In the reverse relationship, some other works use the yield curve to predict the macro-
economic conditions such as Ang, Piazzesi and Wei (2004), the result is that the term spread
have limited power in forecasting GDP but the short term interest rate perform better in pre-
dicting GDP. Accordingly, we check the causal relationships between the risk premia and the
economic growth and found that the risk premia does not determine the risk premia. Thus,
we can be safe from the endogeneity problem.
48ment decision is made with uncertainty over the economic environment such
as uncertainty over exchange rates, and uncertainty over future tax and regula-
tory policy. Thus, investors are sensitive to uncertainty about macroeconomic
variables. The uncertainty of macroeconomic variables can be captured by the
volatility of the series over time. If there is uncertainty in the foreign exchange
rate of that particular country, it will a¤ect the demand and supply of assets in
that particular country which in turn a¤ect the asset price. As a result, the risk
premia in holding assets tend to go up to capture the risk that the international
investors face.
We found that government debt (DEBTGDP) and the …scal de…cit (DEF GDP)
do not determine the risk premia in the panel regression54. This corresponds
to Lamfalussy (1989) who argued that the …scal stance of governments is often
insu¢ciently re‡ected in risk premia.
In the OLS regression, the coe¢cients on DEBTGDP are signi…cant at 6%
and 7% level (columns (1) and (2) of table 7.1). However, the …xed country
e¤ects eliminate the importance of DEBTGDP. From these results, we can
infer that DEBTGDP may be important but that it correlates with the …xed
e¤ects. It is likely to be a problem of the debt data since the series observed
are quite short and they do not vary much over time.
Finally, the political variables (P OLCON and ICRG) have limited explana-
tory power for the risk premia in the panel regressions. In a preliminary test
using simple pair-wise correlation, I …nd that both variables are individually
signi…cant at 1 percent level. However, the e¤ect of these two variables is weak
in the panel regression. This is partially because of the time dummies (–t) in the
regression. Adding time dummies is a conventional way to pick up unobserved
54Even though, the risk premia appears to be signi…cantly positively related to the gov-
ernment debt as a percentage of GDP (DEBTGDP) at 10 percent level in OLS estimations.
However, the estimates does not wipe out all the country’s time invariant …xed e¤ects that
can in‡uence the determinant of the risk premia. Thus the estimate result is subjected to
bias.
49time e¤ect. However, it is important to note that with the time dummies, we
cannot identify variables whose change across time is common to each coun-
try. It is possible that the ICRG index is collinear with the time dummies.
As a result, the political risk index does not signi…cantly determine the risk
premia when the time dummies are included. [Removing the time e¤ects from
the LSDV and LSDVC estimations in table 7.1, we found that the ICRG index
become signi…cant at 5 and 12 percent level, respectively55.]
We can conclude that risk-averse investors tend to require less risk premia
for holding government assets in countries with good economic performance e.g.
high economic growth and stable external price competitive position e.g. low
volatility of real e¤ective exchange rate. Although with caveats, the political
variable and government …scal conditions have limited ability to explain the risk
premia.
6.2.2 Subsamples
In this subsection, we split the data according to income groups (high income
and lower income groups) to restrict the income heterogeneity across countries.
The de…nition of high/lower income countries is according to the World Bank
country classi…cation (2006)56. The details of this classi…cation are presented
in table 1.1. This de…nition is consistent with the cross section regression in the
previous part. We start with the panel estimations of the countries in the high
income group.
High income group The panel regression results for the high income coun-
tries are presented in table 7.2. The data set consist of 21 countries. We …nd
55Removing the time dummis from LSDV and LSDVC models, the coe¢cients (and prob-
abiliity) of ICRG are -0.068 ( p = 0.04) and -0.062 ( p = 0.12), respectively.
56For operational and analytical purposes, the World Bank’s main criterion for classifying
economies is gross national income (GNI) per capita. Based on its GNI per capita, every
economy is classi…ed as low income, middle income (subdivided into lower middle and upper
middle), or high income.
50that the country’s real e¤ective exchange rate (REER) highly positively deter-
mines the risk premia (RP36) across all estimates and model speci…cations. The
estimated coe¢cient of this variable is signi…cant at 1 percent level in LSDV
and LSDVC measures. Comparing to the full sample regression in previous
part, the impact of the real e¤ective exchange rate volatility (V REER) become
less strong here and is signi…cant at about 10 percent level in LSDVC estimate
[ columns (5)-(6) ].
The strong positive relationship between real e¤ective exchange rate and the
risk premia in the sub-sample is intuitively reasonable57. As mentioned earlier,
REER measures the currency appreciation/ depreciation against weighted bas-
ket of foreign currencies and adjusts for relative prices between countries. A
real depreciation lowers the country risk premia in …nancial robust country by
shifting demand toward domestic goods as in the Mundell and Fleming model.
This in turn raises output and the return earned by entrepreneurs. This also
corresponds to Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2004) which suggest that in the
…nancial vulnerable countries, a real depreciation raises the country risk pre-
mium, in contrast, country with …nancial robustness, the opposite happens. In
the LSDVC estimates, the coe¢cients of REER in the risk premia regressions
are 0.059 and 0.058 in the …rst and second models, respectively (see columns (5)
and (6) of table 7.2). The interpretation is as follows, a basis point increase in
REER index associates with 0.224 percent annually increase in the risk premia
in the …rst model (and 0.220 percent annually increase in the risk premia in the
second model).
The e¤ect of V REER is weaker in this sub-sample. The coe¢cients of
V REER in the risk premia regression is 0.005 in both the …rst and second
57The real e¤ective exchange rate (REER) does not appear to signi…cantly determine the
risk premia in the full sample regression. This is possibly due to the income heterogeneity
across samples as we primarily …nd that initial income is an important determinant of the risk
premia in the cross section regression.
51models using LSDVC estimates (see columns (5) and (6)). Thus, we can infer
that as the V REER increases by 1 unit, the risk premia increase by 0.018
unit (the size of coe¢cients on V REER is half of those in the whole sample
regression).
Other macroeconomic variables also determine the risk premia such as eco-
nomic growth (GGDP ), in‡ation (INF L) and government budget de…cit as a
percentage of GDP (DEFGDP ).
Economic growth (GGDP) negatively determines the risk premia and is
signi…cant at 10 percent level in the LSDV and LSDVC models (columns (3)-
(6) of table 7.2). In the LSDVC estimates, the coe¢cients of GGDP in the
risk premia regression are -0.337 and -0.319 in the …rst and second models,
respectively (columns (5) and (6) of table 7.2). As economic growth increase by
1 percent per annum, the risk premia decline by 1.002percent annually in the
…rst model and 0.940 percent annually in the second model, respectively.
In the OLS regression using full sample size, the coe¢cient of GGDP is
found to be statistically insigni…cant (as shown in table 7.1 columns (1) and
(2)). However, using the sample of high income country group, the coe¢cient
of GGDP become signi…cant at 5% level in OLS regressions (see columns (1)
and (2) in table 7.2). This is because using the sub-sample helps restricting the
income heterogeneity across countries. Since high income countries tend to have
high economic growth and vice-a-versa, the growth data is also less heterogenous
here58. The dividing samples by income group helps partially control for the
country …xed e¤ect and thus it allows the data to explain more variation in the
risk premia.
In‡ation (INFL) and government budget de…cit as a percentage of GDP
(DEF GDP) positively determine the risk premia and are signi…cant at 10 per-
58This support our argument earlier that the OLS regressions fail to distinguish the associ-
ation of the low risk and low growth countries in the full samples.
52cent level in the LSDVC estimates. The coe¢cients of INF L in the risk premia
regression are 0.029 and 0.027 in the …rst and second models, respectively (see
columns (5) and (6) of table 7.2). As the in‡ation increase by 1 percent per
annum, the risk premia increase by 0.017 percent annually in the …rst model
and 0.016 percent annually in the second model. The coe¢cients of DEF in the
risk premia regression are 0.021 in both the …rst and second models. As de…cit
increase by 1 percentage of GDP, the risk premia increase by 0.004 percent
annually.
Low income group The panel regression results for Medium to low income
groups are presented in table 7.3. The sample size in this group is very small59.
We thus consider dropping the dynamic analysis and the time dummies in the
regression of the lower income group (as presented in table 7.3). This section
therefore only roughly explains the relationship between risk premia and ex-
planatory variables in these countries. The results from the OLS regression and
the LSDV estimates are presented in table 7.3.
The …xed e¤ect estimations in column (4) of table 7.3 show that the volatil-
ity of real e¤ective exchange rate (VREER) and in‡ation (INF L) are the main
determinants of the risk premia. The coe¢cients of V REER and INFL are sig-
ni…cant at 1 percent and 5 percent level respectively. Although the real e¤ective
exchange rate (REER) does not signi…cantly determine the risk premia, it is
interesting to discuss the sign of the coe¢cient of this variable (see column (4) of
table 7.3). There is a negative relationship between the risk premia and REER
which is in contrast to the results from the high income country group. One pos-
sible explanation here is that the medium to low income countries are countries
with vulnerable …nancial systems. According to Cespedes et. al. (2004) a real
59Initially, there are 13 countries in medium to low income group. However, 5 countries
such as Turkey, South Africa, Uruguay, Hungary, Poland.are outliers. We drop observations
of these 5 countries. After cutting outliers, there are 8 countries left for examinations which
are Brazil, Colombia, Czech Republic, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines and Thailand.
53depreciation has positive relationship with the country risk premium in …nancial
vulnerable countries. In conventional textbook, expansionary monetary policy
and depreciation of the currency are optimal in response to an adverse foreign
shock. In practice, if an economy has a large debt denominated in foreign cur-
rency then a weaker local currency can also exacerbate debt service di¢culties
and wreck the balance sheets of domestic banks and …rms. This channel may
cause devaluations to be contractionary, not expansionary. As documented by
Ricardo Hausmann et al. (2001) and Guillermo Calvo and Carmen Reinhart
(2002), balance sheet e¤ects have emerged as a prime reason why many central
banks are reluctant to allow their currencies to devalue in response to external
shocks.
Although the coe¢cient of GGDP is signi…cant at the 10% level in the …xed
e¤ects estimation in column (4), its predictive power is not strong after omitting
other insigni…cant variables. The model in column (5) is the result of omitting
all insigni…cant variables, V REER and INF L are still signi…cantly determine
the risk premia and are signi…cant at 1 percent and 10 percent level respectively.
In the regression of columns (4) and (5), there are only 4 countries observed here
which are Colombia, Malaysia, Philippines and Czech Republic. This is because
the data for REER are not available in Brazil, Mexico, India, and Thailand.
In column (6), if we omit REER from the regression, we can observe data
for 8 countries which are Brazil, Colombia, Czech Republic, India, Malaysia,
Mexico, Philippines and Thailand. The coe¢cient of INFL is signi…cant at 5
percent level.
7 Conclusion
This study generates monthly risk premia data using zero coupon government
treasury bills for 43 countries over the period of 1994-2006. The measure of
54risk premia is based on the ARCH-in-Mean (ARCH-M) model introduced by
Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987). We show that the risk premia are time varying
and also vary considerably between countries. This study also examines the
macroeconomic and political determinants of the risk premia by using cross
section regressions and dynamic panel regression analysis.
The cross section regression shows that on average through 1994-2006, the
risk premia for holding government assets required by risk averse investors is
positively in‡uenced by the level of in‡ation and the de…cit as a percentage
of GDP and is negatively determined by the country’s economic growth. Ad-
ditionally, lower income countries are estimated to have risk premia about 19
percent more than in the high income countries outside the Eurozone, holding
other variables constant. In the high income countries outside the Eurozone,
the risk premia on holding government assets is predicted to be 10 percent more
than those in Eurozone.
Using panel regression analysis, we found that economic growth and the
volatility of the real e¤ective exchange rate are the main determinants of risk
premia in the full sample regression. Risk averse investors require lower risk
premia for holding government assets in countries with good economic perfor-
mance e.g. high economic growth and stable external price competitive position
e.g. low volatility of real e¤ective exchange rate. If we split the sample by
income group, the real e¤ective exchange rate which re‡ects country’s external
price competitiveness plays important role in high income countries. In the high
income countries, the devaluation of currency brings in the favorable result to
the economy. This is consistent with the Mundell-Fleming model. There is
a better price competitiveness which in turn reduces the country risk premia.
The opposite relationship is found in the regression of lower income countries.
The possible explanation is that in a …nancial vulnerable countries, weaker lo-
55cal currency can exacerbate the external debt service di¢culties which result in
economic contraction. This in turn raises the country risk premia. However, the
impact of the level of real e¤ective exchange rate is less strong in the low income
group. For lower income countries, the volatility of the real e¤ective exchange
rate which re‡ects uncertainty in the exchange rate market plays important
role in determining the risk premia. The higher real exchange rate volatility,
the greater risk premia require for holding government assets in that country.
The institutional variables and the government …scal conditions have limited
power in explaining the risk premia in this study. This is possibly due to the
measurement errors.
Lastly, it is useful to discuss the policy recommendations as follows. The
membership of the European Monetary Union is proved to reduce the risk pre-
mia in this study. The economic growth is good as it associates with lower risk
premia. On the average of time (using cross section regression), the in‡ation
and the budgetary positions tend to have strong e¤ect on the economy which is
on contrary to the IMF conventional wisdom.
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60Table 1: Data Definition and sources       
1.1. Interest Rate Data and definitions of country income group 
Country 
Code 
Country  Country  Country  Country  Income group 
111  USA   USD Government Agency (FMC84) Zero Coupon Yield  US Dollar  1994:12-2006:01  High income 
112  UK   GBP United Kingdom (IYC22) Zero Coupon Yield  British Pound  1994:12-2006:01  High income 
122  AUSTRIA   EUR Austria Sovereign (IYC63) Zero Coupon Yield  Austrian Schilling  1994:12-2006:01  High income 
124  BELGIUM   EUR Belgium Sovereign (IYC6) Zero coupon Yield  Belgian Franc  1994:12-2006:01  High income 
128  DENMARK   DKK Denmark Sovereign (IYC11) Zero coupon Yield  Danish Krone  1994:12-2006:01  High income 
132  FRANCE   EUR France Sovereign (IYC14) Zero Coupon Yield  French Franc  1994:12-2006:01  High income 
134  GERMANY   EUR Germany Sovereign (IYC16) Zero Coupon Yield  German Mark  1994:12-2006:01  High income 
136  ITALY   EU Italy Sovereign (IYC40) Zero Coupon Yield  Italian Lira  1994:12-2006:01  High income 
138  NETHERLANDS   EUR Netherlands Sovereign (IYC20) Zero coupon yield  Dutch Guilder  1994:12-2006:01  High income 
142  NORWAY   NOK Norway Sovereign (IYC78) Zero coupon yield  Norwegian Krone  1994:12-2006:01  High income 
144  SWEDEN   SEK Sweden Sovereign (FMC259) Zero coupon Yield  Swedish Krona  1994:12-2006:01  High income 
146  SWITZERLAND   CHF Switzerland Sovereign (IYC82) Zero coupon Yield  Swiss Franc  1994:12-2006:01  High income 
156  CANADA   CAD Canada Sovereign (UYC7) Zero Coupon Yield  Canadian Dollar  1994:12-2006:01  High income 
158  JAPAN   JPY Sovereign (IYC18) Zero Coupon Yield  Japanese Yen  1990:01-2006:01  High income 
172  FINLAND   EUR Finland Sovereign (IYC81) Zero Coupon Yield  Finnish Markka  1994:12-2006:01  High income 
174  GREECE   EUR Greece Sovereign (FMC904) Zero coupon Yield  EURO  2000:08-2006:01  High income 
178  IRELAND   EUR Ireland Sovereign (IYC62) Zero coupon Yield  Irish Punt  1994:12-2006:01  High income 
182  PORTUGAL   EUR Portugal Sovereign (IYC84) Zero coupon Yield  Portuguese Escudo  1994:12-2006:01  High income 
184  SPAIN   EUR Spain Sovereign (IYC61) Zero coupon Yield  Spanish peseta  1994:12-2006:01  High income 
186  TURKEY   US dollar Turkey Sovereign (IYC I249) Zero coupon yield  US Dollar  2002:12-2006:01  Upper middle income 
193  AUSTRALIA   AUD Australia Sovereign (IYC1) Zero Coupon Yield  Australian dollar  1994:12-2006:01  High income 
196  NEW ZEALAND   NZD New Zealand (IYC49) Zero Coupon Yield  New Zealand Dollar  1994:12-2006:01  High income 
199  SOUTH AFRICA   ZAR South Africa Sovereign (FMC262) Zero Coupon Yield  South African Rand  1994:12-2006:01  Upper middle income 
213  ARGENTINA   Argentina Sovereign (FMC801) Zero Coupon Yield  Argentine Peso  1998:07-2006:01  Upper middle income 
223  BRAZIL   USD Brazil Sovereign (FMC802) Zero coupon yield  US Dollar  1998:06-2006:02  Lower middle income 
233  COLOMBIA   USD Colombia Sovereign (FMC803) Zero Coupon Yield  Colombian Peso  1998:06-2006:01  Lower middle income 
273  MEXICO   USD Mexico Sovereign (FMC804) Zero coupon yield  Mexican Peso  1998:06-2006:02  Upper middle income 
298  Uruguay   BFV USD Uruguay Sovereign   US Dollar  2000:07-2006:01  Upper middle income 
436  ISRAEL   Israel Makam Bond  Israel Shekel  1996:11-2006:01  High income 
524  SRI LANKA   LKR Sri Lanka Sovereign (FMC133) Zero Coupon Yield  Sri Lankan Rupee  1994:12-2001:01  Lower middle income 
532  HONG KONG   Hong Kong Sovereign (IYC95) Zero Coupon Yield  Hong Kong Dollar  1994:12-2006:01  High income 
534  INDIA   India Sovereign (FMC123) Zero Coupon Yield  Indian Rupee  1998:11-2006:01  Low income 
536  INDONESIA   IDR Indonesia Sovereign (FMC132) Zero Coupon Yield 3 Month  Indonesian Rupiah  1994:12-2001:01  Lower middle income 
542  KOREA   KRW Korea Treasury (FMC232) Zero Coupon Yield  South Korean Won  1999:09-2006:01  High income 
548  MALAYSIA   MYR Malaysia Sovereign (FMC128) Zero Coupon Yield 3 Month  Malaysian Ringgit  1999:09-2006:01  Upper middle income 566  PHILIPPINES   Philippines treasury Bill Generic yield  Philippines Peso  1995:10-2006:01  Lower middle income 
576  SINGAPORE   Singapore Sovereign (IYC107) Zero Coupon Yield  Singapore Dollar  1994:12-2006:01  High income 
578  THAILAND   THB Thailand Sovereign (FMC122) Zero Coupon Yield 3 Month  Thai Baht  1994:12-2006:01  Lower middle income 
924  CHINA   CNY China Sovereign (FMC20) Zero Coupon Yield  China Renminbi  2003:09-2006:01  Lower middle income 
935  CZECH REPUBLIC   CZK Chech Republic (FMC480) Zero Coupon Yield  Czech Koruna  1997:07-2006:01  Upper middle income 
936  SLOVAK REPUBLIC   SKK Slovakia Swap rate Zero coupon yield  Slovakia Koruna  2003:02-2006:01  Upper middle income 
944  HUNGARY   HUF Hungary Sovereign (FMC114) Zero Coupon Yield  Hungarian Forint  1998:06-2006:01  Upper middle income 
964  POLAND   PLN Poland Sovereign (FMC119) Zero coupon Yield  Polish Zloty  1998:05-2006:01  Upper middle income 
Note:  
- Descriptions apply for 3-month, 6-month and 12-month treasury bills. For example, the description for 3-month yield is “USD Government Agency (FMC84) Zero Coupon 
Yield for 3-month treasury bills”. 
- FMC stands for Fair market value curve. The fair market value indices are derived from data points on Bloomberg’s option free market curves. The yield at each maturity 
point represents the composite yield of securities around that maturity. 
- IYC stands for International Yield curve. 
- Makam is a short-term (up to one year) zero-coupon bond. The Makam market is the most sensitive barometer of expected changes in interest rates in the monetary auction, 
and is generally the first to respond to interest rate changes.  
-Income group: Economies are divided according to 2005 GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. The groups are: low income, $875 or less; lower 
middle income, $876 - $3,465; upper middle income, $3,466 - $10,725; and high income, $10,726 or more. [World bank country classification, 2006]  
  
 
1.2: The Variables    
Variable   Description  Source 
RP36  Risk premia for holding 6 month treasury bills (comparing to 3 month treasury bills)  Calculation 
  The cross section regression uses natural log of country’s mean risk premia, 1994-2006. The panel regression uses natural log of (1+(RP36/10))   
RP312  Risk premia for holding 12 month treasury bills (comparing to 3 month treasury bills)  Calculation 
  The cross section regression uses natural log of country’s mean risk premia, 1994-2006. The panel regression uses natural log of (1+(RP312/100))   
INFL  CPI % CHANGE over corresponding period of previous year (Percent per annum)  IFS, 2006 
  The cross section regression uses natural log of mean inflation, 1994-2006.  The panel regression uses natural log of (1+(INFL/10))   
REER  Real Effective Exchange Rate (CPI Based) (REER Based on REL.CP)   IFS, 2006 
  The cross section regression uses natural log of mean REER, 1994-2006. The panel regression uses natural log of this variable.   
VREER  The Volatility of Real Effective Exchange Rate (CPI Based)   Calculation 
  In the cross section regression, VREER is calculated by taking natural log of standard deviation of REER over 1994-2006.   
  In the panel regression, the annually observed VREER is calculated by taking natural log of standard deviation of REER over 12 months.   
GGDP  Growth rate of GDP over corresponding period of previous year [gt= (log (GDPt)-log(GDPt-4))/4]. The unit is in percent quarterly.  Calculation 
  Data source: Gross Domestic Product (National Currency), IFS, 2006   
  The cross section regression uses natural log of mean GDP growth, 1994-2006. The panel regression uses annually observed GDP growth.   
DEFIGDP  The government deficit as a percentage of GDP  Calculation 
  The cross section regression uses natural log of (1+(DEFIGDP)/10). The panel regression uses natural log of (1+(DEFIGDP/30))   
  Data source: DEFICIT (-) OR SURPLUS, IFS and Gross Domestic Product (National Currency), IFS   
DEBTGDP  Total central government debt % of GDP (AMT: Stocks: Outstanding amounts)  Calculation 
  The cross section regression uses natural log of mean debt as a percentage of GDP, 1994-2006   
   The panel regression uses natural log of this variable    
  Data Source: For OECD countries: International Comparisons - Central Government Debt, statistical yearbook, 1980-2003, OECD 
                    : For non-OECD countries: World Development Indicators   
POLCON5  Extent of political constraints in policy-making process. Higher value implies stronger constraints and more stability in the policy.  Heinsz, 2005. 
  The cross-section regressions use the natural log of mean POLCON5, 1994-2006.   
ICRG  The political risk rating. The lower the risk point assigned, the higher the political risk.  The PRS group, 2006 
  The cross section regression uses natural log of mean ICRG, 1994-2006   
EMU  Dummy for member countries joining the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)  EU, 2006 
  Country list: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain    
NEMU_RICH Dummy for high income countries which do not belong to the EMU   EU, 2006 
  Country list: Canada, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, UK, Japan, USA, Australia, New Zealand, Israel, Hong Kong, Korea, and Singapore   
POOR  Dummy for low income to middle income countries.  World Bank, 2006 
  Country list: Turkey, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay, Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia, Malaysia,    
  Philippines, Thailand, China, Czech republic, Slovak republic, Hungary and Poland   
  Note that Czech republic, Slovak republic, Hungary and Poland are EMU member on 1 May 2004. They are included in this group due to   
  their income level and stage of EU membership.   
        
  
Table 2: The risk premia and excess holding yield (1991-2006) 
 
Table 2.1: Excess Holding yield 3 VS 6 months 
Country  Code  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Obs 
USA  111  0.35  0.40  -0.33  1.90  130 
UK  112  0.20  0.38  -0.56  1.38  131 
AUSTRIA  122  0.15  0.28  -0.46  0.95  131 
BELGIUM  124  0.16  0.37  -1.42  1.57  131 
DENMARK  128  0.22  0.37  -0.70  1.35  131 
FRANCE  132  0.14  0.41  -1.49  1.74  131 
GERMANY  134  0.09  0.27  -0.46  0.91  131 
ITALY  136  0.23  0.48  -1.81  1.74  131 
NETHERLANDS  138  0.16  0.29  -0.46  1.09  131 
NORWAY  142  0.03  0.67  -3.15  1.66  131 
SWEDEN  144  0.28  0.39  -0.83  1.50  131 
SWITZERLAND  146  0.21  0.40  -0.88  1.20  131 
CANADA  156  0.34  0.56  -0.95  2.68  131 
JAPAN  158  0.11  0.39  -1.73  1.57  190 
FINLAND  172  0.16  0.43  -0.73  2.02  131 
GREECE  174  0.11  0.22  -0.47  0.83  63 
IRELAND  178  0.10  0.43  -1.45  1.44  131 
PORTUGAL  182  0.20  0.50  -1.11  1.97  131 
SPAIN  184  0.17  0.32  -0.58  1.11  131 
TURKEY  186  0.11  1.63  -5.03  5.33  35 
AUSTRALIA  193  0.12  0.46  -0.75  2.17  131 
NEW ZEALAND  196  0.14  0.74  -1.44  3.49  131 
SOUTH AFRICA  199  0.79  1.58  -7.49  5.88  131 
ARGENTINA  213  -3.95  18.09  -71.72  52.48  42 
BRAZIL  223  1.00  4.27  -9.80  22.75  89 
COLOMBIA  233  0.57  1.73  -4.49  5.69  89 
MEXICO  273  0.56  1.23  -2.42  7.91  89 
Uruguay  298  -0.99  9.73  -38.55  20.22  64 
ISRAEL  436  0.03  1.26  -3.67  2.62  108 
SRI LANKA  524  0.14  0.37  -0.53  1.13  71 
HONG KONG  532  0.34  1.06  -3.51  4.93  131 
INDIA  534  0.36  0.56  -1.54  1.81  84 
INDONESIA  536  0.17  0.36  -0.47  1.18  71 
KOREA  542  0.59  0.44  -0.39  1.56  74 
MALAYSIA  548  0.18  0.37  -1.04  1.56  74 
PHILIPPINES  566  1.91  2.10  -7.36  9.33  121 
SINGAPORE  576  0.11  0.77  -1.87  2.64  131 
THAILAND  578  0.19  0.44  -1.20  1.27  131 
CHINA  924  0.02  0.03  -0.04  0.07  26 
CZECH REPUBLIC  935  0.46  0.73  -0.51  4.18  90 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC  936  0.28  0.64  -0.56  1.42  23 
HUNGARY  944  0.02  1.40  -3.36  3.62  89 
POLAND  964  0.17  1.48  -4.28  6.86  90 
  
Table 2.2: Excess Holding yield 3 VS 12 months 
Country  Code  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Obs 
USA  111  1.69  2.03  -1.88  7.26  124 
UK  112  0.83  1.44  -1.88  4.54  125 
AUSTRIA  122  1.10  1.35  -1.61  4.59  125 
BELGIUM  124  1.07  1.70  -2.73  6.58  125 
DENMARK  128  1.90  1.70  -1.44  7.34  125 
FRANCE  132  1.04  1.41  -1.43  6.10  125 
GERMANY  134  0.76  1.45  -2.17  5.18  125 
ITALY  136  1.63  1.89  -3.73  7.11  125 
NETHERLANDS  138  1.07  1.45  -1.61  5.77  125 
NORWAY  142  0.47  2.84  -9.02  6.37  125 
SWEDEN  144  2.10  2.00  -1.57  7.40  125 
SWITZERLAND  146  1.31  1.65  -2.89  5.90  125 
CANADA  156  1.98  2.08  -1.04  7.16  125 
JAPAN  158  0.89  1.61  -3.63  6.36  184 
FINLAND  172  1.19  1.98  -2.13  7.71  125 
GREECE  174  0.98  1.10  -1.56  3.84  57 
IRELAND  178  0.81  1.86  -3.46  5.95  125 
PORTUGAL  182  1.22  2.17  -4.16  8.04  125 
SPAIN  184  1.33  1.68  -1.55  6.02  125 
TURKEY  186  1.67  4.95  -5.59  20.51  29 
AUSTRALIA  193  0.90  1.92  -2.28  7.28  125 
NEW ZEALAND  196  0.31  2.82  -5.76  9.65  125 
SOUTH AFRICA  199  2.06  5.44  -17.63  17.56  125 
ARGENTINA  213  -19.79  48.96  -189.72  22.96  36 
BRAZIL  223  5.07  14.68  -35.00  80.73  83 
COLOMBIA  233  3.51  5.42  -4.39  26.22  83 
MEXICO  273  3.22  3.81  -2.07  22.94  83 
Uruguay  298  -10.97  35.15  -112.44  47.69  58 
ISRAEL  436  1.21  4.37  -11.92  9.46  102 
SRI LANKA  524  0.82  1.69  -2.09  5.59  65 
HONG KONG  532  1.98  3.60  -7.11  16.71  125 
INDIA  534  1.96  1.99  -2.51  7.35  78 
INDONESIA  536  0.99  1.77  -1.79  6.27  65 
KOREA  542  3.04  2.10  -1.26  7.89  68 
MALAYSIA  548  1.03  1.05  -1.88  3.77  68 
PHILIPPINES  566  7.42  7.40  -14.38  28.98  115 
SINGAPORE  576  0.74  1.89  -3.75  7.96  125 
THAILAND  578  1.39  1.74  -3.79  6.75  125 
CHINA  924  0.14  0.12  -0.06  0.32  20 
CZECH REPUBLIC  935  2.74  3.31  -0.74  15.80  84 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC  936  2.19  2.07  -2.02  4.12  17 
HUNGARY  944  0.40  5.38  -16.06  8.81  83 
POLAND  964  0.63  7.13  -17.17  18.11  84 
  
Table 2.3: Risk Premia: 3 VS 6 months 
Country  Code  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Obs
* 
USA  111  0.24  0.21  -0.04  0.87  133 
UK  112  0.18  0.20  -0.07  0.78  133 
AUSTRIA  122  0.13  0.06  0.03  0.27  133 
BELGIUM  124  0.17  0.10  0.05  0.40  133 
DENMARK  128  0.20  0.15  0.00  0.59  133 
FRANCE  132  0.14  0.23  -0.09  0.84  133 
GERMANY  134  0.06  0.10  -0.09  0.34  133 
ITALY  136  0.19  0.10  0.06  0.41  133 
NETHERLANDS  138  0.14  0.05  0.07  0.30  133 
NORWAY  142  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.08  133 
SWEDEN  144  0.25  0.08  0.15  0.50  133 
SWITZERLAND  146  0.27  0.13  0.09  0.56  133 
CANADA  156  0.25  0.13  0.09  0.65  133 
JAPAN  158  0.09  0.08  0.01  0.32  192 
FINLAND  172  0.13  0.05  0.05  0.31  133 
GREECE  174  0.10  0.04  0.06  0.22  65 
IRELAND  178  0.12  0.06  0.05  0.33  133 
PORTUGAL  182  0.16  0.10  0.04  0.42  133 
SPAIN  184  0.14  0.10  0.00  0.36  133 
TURKEY  186  -  -  -  -  38 
AUSTRALIA  193  0.10  0.25  -0.24  0.93  133 
NEW ZEALAND  196  0.11  0.16  -0.05  0.65  133 
SOUTH AFRICA  199  0.70  0.23  0.50  1.62  133 
ARGENTINA  213  0.80  1.01  0.03  3.33  45 
BRAZIL  223  0.88  0.85  0.08  3.07  91 
COLOMBIA  233  0.61  0.52  -0.03  1.90  91 
MEXICO  273  0.53  0.52  0.00  2.13  91 
Uruguay  298  0.59  1.94  -4.32  2.57  66 
ISRAEL  436  0.15  0.16  -0.23  0.39  110 
SRI LANKA  524  0.16  0.03  0.07  0.20  74 
HONG KONG  532  0.42  0.11  0.32  0.75  133 
INDIA  534  0.36  0.29  0.06  1.31  86 
INDONESIA  536  0.17  0.00  0.16  0.17  74 
KOREA  542  0.54  0.21  0.22  1.05  76 
MALAYSIA  548  0.23  0.14  0.08  0.57  76 
PHILIPPINES  566  1.98  0.58  1.49  3.60  123 
SINGAPORE  576  0.09  0.16  -0.10  0.52  133 
THAILAND  578  0.21  0.12  0.08  0.66  133 
CHINA  924  -  -  -  -  28 
CZECH REPUBLIC  935  0.41  0.38  0.03  1.63  92 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC  936  -  -  -  -  24 
HUNGARY  944  0.16  0.56  -1.14  0.85  91 
POLAND  964  0.26  0.41  -0.88  0.68  92 
 
                                                 
* Obs stands for number of months observed.  
Table 2.4: Risk Premia 3 VS 12 months 
Country  Code  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Obs 
USA  111  0.81  1.77  -2.06  5.96  133 
UK  112           
AUSTRIA  122  0.93  0.27  0.53  1.57  133 
BELGIUM  124  0.87  0.33  0.40  1.87  133 
DENMARK  128  1.87  0.90  0.84  4.56  133 
FRANCE  132  0.72  0.54  -0.11  2.46  133 
GERMANY  134  0.84  0.58  0.13  2.58  133 
ITALY  136  1.22  0.52  0.43  2.45  133 
NETHERLANDS  138  0.89  0.32  0.41  1.74  133 
NORWAY  142  0.76  0.01  0.72  0.77  133 
SWEDEN  144  1.74  0.56  1.12  3.39  133 
SWITZERLAND  146  1.16  0.32  0.73  1.94  133 
CANADA  156  1.25  0.79  0.29  3.14  133 
JAPAN  158  0.71  0.65  0.04  2.36  192 
FINLAND  172  0.90  0.40  0.39  2.18  133 
GREECE  174           
IRELAND  178  0.73  0.17  0.50  1.20  133 
PORTUGAL  182  1.07  0.55  0.46  2.35  133 
SPAIN  184  1.02  0.42  0.45  2.05  133 
TURKEY  186           
AUSTRALIA  193  0.50  1.23  -1.19  4.45  133 
NEW ZEALAND  196  0.08  0.87  -1.10  2.82  133 
SOUTH AFRICA  199  2.57  0.07  2.49  2.79  133 
ARGENTINA  213  3.42  3.03  0.69  9.86  45 
BRAZIL  223  5.05  5.16  0.75  20.15  91 
COLOMBIA  233  2.66  2.33  -0.36  9.85  91 
MEXICO  273  2.48  2.30  -0.33  9.68  91 
Uruguay  298  -1.34  22.07  -51.18  22.46  66 
ISRAEL  436  2.38  1.12  -0.40  3.84  110 
SRI LANKA  524  0.90  0.37  -0.03  1.42  74 
HONG KONG  532  2.45  0.53  1.84  3.70  133 
INDIA  534  1.36  1.68  -1.61  5.85  86 
INDONESIA  536  1.16  0.25  0.58  1.53  74 
KOREA  542  2.43  1.74  -0.08  6.89  76 
MALAYSIA  548  1.25  0.87  0.36  3.47  76 
PHILIPPINES  566  7.46  1.54  5.77  12.25  123 
SINGAPORE  576  0.46  1.10  -1.22  3.96  133 
THAILAND  578  1.71  2.09  -0.16  10.51  133 
CHINA  924           
CZECH REPUBLIC  935           
SLOVAK REPUBLIC  936           
HUNGARY  944           
POLAND  964  1.60  3.90  -8.43  5.48  92 
 Table 3: result from ARCH-M regression 
 
Table 3.1: Risk Premium 3 VS 6 months 
ARCH-M  ARCH  Number  Country  Date 
b  d  a0  a1 
1 USA  1994:12-2006:01  -0.32  1.61  0.02  0.95 
         (-2.02)**  (3.49)***  (0.80)  (3.79)*** 
2 UK  1994:12-2006:01  -1.00  3.35  0.06  0.55 
         (-1.78)*  (1.99)**  (1.92)*  (1.86)* 
3 AUSTRIA  1994:12-2006:01  -0.07  0.75  0.01  0.84 
         (-1.07)  (2.45)*  (2.13)*  (4.10)*** 
4 BELGIUM  1994:12-2006:01  0.01  0.42  0.00  1.52 
         (0.28)  (3.02)***  (0.32)  (9.27)*** 
5 DENMARK  1994:12-2006:01  -0.24  1.39  0.03  0.79 
         (-2.32)**  (3.63)***  (2.57)***  (3.78)*** 
6 FRANCE  1994:12-2006:01  -0.20  1.06  0.01  1.07 
         (-5.27)*** (5.91)***  (1.24)  (6.69)*** 
7 GERMANY  1994:12-2006:01  -0.26  1.29  0.01  0.87 
         (-2.92)*** (3.11)***  (1.38)  (3.89)*** 
8 ITALY  1994:12-2006:01  0.00  0.40  0.01  1.27 
         (0.03)  (1.90)*  (1.32)  (7.45)*** 
9 NETHERLANDS  1994:12-2006:01  -0.01  0.57  0.01  0.89 
         (-0.17)  (1.67)*  (1.03)  (3.59)*** 
10 NORWAY  1994:12-2006:01  0.00  0.03  0.00  1.34 
         (0.03)  (0.26)  (0.15)  (9.45)*** 
11 SWEDEN  1994:12-2006:01  -0.32  1.58  0.08  0.36 
         (-0.66)  (1.12)  (4.53)***  (1.70)* 
12 SWITZERLAND  1994:12-2006:01  0.03  0.60  0.01  1.21 
         (1.17)  (6.02)***  (1.38)  (7.13)*** 
13 CANADA  1994:12-2006:01  -0.01  0.50  0.02  1.08 
         (-0.09)  (1.83)*  (0.90)  (7.12)*** 
14 JAPAN  1990:01-2006:01  0.00  0.28  0.00  1.13 
         (1.30)  (3.69)***  (1.22)  (11.29)*** 
15 FINLAND  1994:12-2006:01  0.02  0.28  0.01  1.03 
         (0.49)  (1.46)  (1.27)  (5.52)*** 
16 GREECE  2000:08-2006:01  -0.03  0.60  0.01  0.77 
         (-0.28)  (1.25)  (1.46)  (2.67)*** 
17 IRELAND  1994:12-2006:01  0.02  0.25  0.01  1.08 
         (0.53)  (1.51)  (1.13)  (5.68)*** 
18 PORTUGAL  1994:12-2006:01  -0.01  0.39  0.01  1.04 
         (-0.19)  (1.86)*  (2.09)**  (6.13)*** 
19 SPAIN  1994:12-2006:01  -0.11  0.88  0.01  0.97 
         (-1.80)*  (2.91)***  (0.80)  (4.31)*** 
20 TURKEY  2002:12-2006:01  -0.30  0.20  -0.11  1.05 
         (-1.47)  (0.96)  (-0.57)  (5.05)*** 
21 AUSTRALIA  1994:12-2006:01  -0.67  1.94  0.04  0.82 
       (-3.90)*** (4.42)***  (1.47)  (4.11)*** 
22 NEW ZEALAND  1994:12-2006:01  -0.14  0.42  0.03  0.96 
         (-1.99)**  (2.29)**  (1.46)  (5.16)*** 
23 SOUTH AFRICA  1994:12-2006:01  0.38  0.23  0.15  1.10 
       (1.30)  (0.81)  (0.99)  (4.95)*** 
24 ARGENTINA  1998:07-2002:01  -0.05  0.05  0.05  2.45 
         (-0.09)  (0.26)  (0.03)  (4.88)*** 
25 BRAZIL  1998:06-2006:02  -0.03  0.26  0.05  1.36        (-0.23)  (2.72)***  (0.60)  (7.62)*** 
26 COLOMBIA  1998:06-2006:01  -0.29  0.59  0.01  1.15 
         (-1.28)  (2.69)***  (0.07)  (5.21)*** 
27 MEXICO  1998:06-2006:02  -0.15  0.69  0.01  1.12 
       (-2.11)**  (3.94)***  (0.41)  (6.31)*** 
28 Uruguay  2000:07-2006:01  4.16  -0.39  14.79  0.96 
         (1.49)  (-0.90)  (1.79)*  (4.47)*** 
29 ISRAEL  1996:11-2006:01  0.68  -0.43  0.42  0.72 
       (1.13)  (-0.85)  (2.14)**  (3.74)*** 
30 SRI LANKA  1994:12-2001:01  0.32  -0.44  0.06  0.61 
         (1.12)  (-0.55)  (1.15)  (1.31) 
31 HONG KONG  1994:12-2006:01  0.28  0.16  0.04  1.14 
       (2.23)**  (0.74)  (1.12)  (7.66)*** 
32 INDIA  1998:11-2006:01  -0.47  1.64  0.10  0.68 
         (-2.78)*** (4.03)***  (3.24)***  (3.42)*** 
33 INDONESIA  1994:12-2001:01  0.18  -0.04  0.07  0.49 
       (0.39)  (-0.03)  (1.14)  (0.81) 
34 KOREA  1999:09-2006:01  -0.66  3.01  0.05  0.67 
         (-0.86)  (1.53)  (0.87)  (1.55) 
35 MALAYSIA  1999:09-2006:01  0.04  0.43  0.00  1.94 
       (1.25)  (2.12)**  (-0.14)  (5.07)*** 
36 PHILIPPINES  1995:10-2006:01  -0.01  1.02  2.03  0.50 
         (-0.01)  (2.50)**  (7.60)***  (3.27)*** 
37 SINGAPORE  1994:12-2006:01  -0.26  0.50  0.06  0.92 
       (-2.07)**  (2.27)**  (1.43)  (4.34)*** 
38 THAILAND  1994:12-2006:01  -0.12  0.81  0.04  0.88 
         (-1.12)  (2.64)***  (2.79)***  (3.84)*** 
39 CHINA  2003:09-2006:01  2.31  -82.78  0.00  0.04 
       (5.68)***  (.)  (2.71)***  (1.29) 
40 CZECH REPUBLIC  1997:07-2006:01  -0.12  0.98  0.01  1.19 
         (-1.15)  (3.19)***  (0.74)  (7.05)*** 
41 SLOVAK REPUBLIC 2003:02-2006:01  Flat Log-likehood      
               
42 HUNGARY  1998:06-2006:01  3.80  -2.93  0.80  0.49 
         (1.54)  (-1.39)  (1.85)*  (1.44) 
43 POLAND  1998:05-2006:01  0.86  -0.49  0.03  1.07 
         (4.29)***  (-2.02)**  (0.32)  (6.97)*** 
Notes: Figures in parenthesis () are t-ratios.  
           The parameters are correspond to equation (29) in Section 4.1: Risk premia in an ARCHM model. 
            *** indicates that a coefficient is significant at the 1% level;  
            ** significant at the 5% level, and * significant at the 10% level. 
 
Table 3.2: Risk Premium 3 VS 12 months 
 
ARCH-M  ARCH  Number  Country  Date 
b  d  a0  a0 
1 USA  1994:12-2006:01  -14.07  10.60  0.93  0.54 
         (-1.76)*  (1.89)*  (1.51)  (1.76)* 
2 UK  1994:12-2006:01  flat          
                    
3 AUSTRIA  1994:12-2006:01  0.35  0.47  0.11  0.97 
         (2.58)***  (3.24)***  (1.17)  (4.28)*** 
4 BELGIUM  1994:12-2006:01  0.28  0.39  0.04  1.11 
         (2.37)**  (3.14)***  (0.48)  (5.74)*** 5 DENMARK  1994:12-2006:01  0.39  1.01  0.12  1.01 
         (2.69)***  (7.19)***  (1.54)  (4.93)*** 
6 FRANCE  1994:12-2006:01  -0.47  1.04  0.07  0.99 
         (-2.26)**  (4.83)***  (0.65)  (4.33)*** 
7 GERMANY  1994:12-2006:01  -0.10  0.69  0.04  1.06 
         (-0.98)  (6.59)***  (0.38)  (4.81)*** 
8 ITALY  1994:12-2006:01  0.21  0.62  0.06  1.07 
         (1.61)  (4.84)***  (0.58)  (5.81)*** 
9 NETHERLANDS  1994:12-2006:01  0.27  0.48  0.06  1.05 
         (2.39)**  (4.2)***  (0.88)  (5.81)*** 
10 NORWAY  1994:12-2006:01  0.77  -0.01  0.91  0.92 
         (2.01)**  (-0.04)  (3.03)***  (5.19)*** 
11 SWEDEN  1994:12-2006:01  0.41  0.86  0.46  0.80 
       (0.75)  (2.06)**  (1.29)  (3.32)*** 
12 SWITZERLAND  1994:12-2006:01  0.54  0.41  0.18  1.03 
         (2.80)***  (2.27)**  (1.86)*  (5.10)*** 
13 CANADA  1994:12-2006:01  -0.40  0.97  0.24  0.92 
       (-0.82)  (2.36)**  (0.97)  (3.51)*** 
14 JAPAN  1990:01-2006:01  0.02  0.68  0.00  0.99 
         (1.04)  (7.23)***  (1.36)  (8.41)*** 
15 FINLAND  1994:12-2006:01  0.19  0.44  0.11  1.00 
       (1.14)  (3.02)***  (0.80)  (4.40)*** 
16 GREECE  2000:08-2006:01             
                    
17 IRELAND  1994:12-2006:01  0.41  0.20  0.15  0.98 
       (1.74)*  (1.04)  (1.27)  (4.79)*** 
18 PORTUGAL  1994:12-2006:01  0.30  0.43  0.10  1.03 
         (1.76)*  (2.90)***  (1.68)*  (6.06)*** 
19 SPAIN  1994:12-2006:01  0.22  0.57  0.12  0.98 
       (1.30)  (3.15)***  (0.97)  (4.13)*** 
20 TURKEY  2002:12-2006:01  -150.39  34.07  19.32  0.03 
         (-0.05)  (0.05)  (2.15)**  (0.05) 
21 AUSTRALIA  1994:12-2006:01  -4.20  3.16  0.65  0.77 
       (-2.89)*** (3.24)***  (1.57)  (3.50)*** 
22 NEW ZEALAND  1994:12-2006:01  -1.59  0.73  0.27  1.01 
         (-4.91)*** (4.20)***  (1.08)  (5.44)*** 
23 SOUTH AFRICA  1994:12-2006:01  2.43  0.03  2.35  0.97 
       (2.53)**  (0.11)  (0.88)  (3.98)*** 
24 ARGENTINA  1998:07-2006:01  0.47  0.05  -2.16  2.55 
         (0.13)  (0.15)  (-0.08)  (2.83)*** 
25 BRAZIL  1998:06-2006:02  -1.84  0.65  13.57  0.99 
       (-1.09)  (2.71)***  (3.51)***  (5.37)*** 
26 COLOMBIA  1998:06-2006:01  -2.13  1.08  1.44  1.08 
         (-1.79)*  (3.16)***  (0.91)  (5.43)*** 
27 MEXICO  1998:06-2006:02  -1.12  1.10  -0.18  1.39 
       (-3.68)*** (6.52)***  (-0.49)  (7.88)*** 
28 Uruguay  2000:07-2006:01  60.57  -2.35  145.22  0.78 
         (2.10)**  (-1.97)**  (0.59)  (1.99)** 
29 ISRAEL  1996:11-2006:01  4.77  -0.58  2.23  1.02 
       (4.79)***  (-1.92)*  (1.70)*  (4.27)*** 
30 SRI LANKA  1994:12-2001:01  1.83  -0.57  0.30  0.95 
         (3.97)***  (-1.87)*  (0.80)  (2.93)*** 
31 HONG KONG  1994:12-2006:01  1.65  0.23  0.43  1.26 
       (5.58)***  (1.48)  (0.87)  (5.64)*** 
32 INDIA  1998:11-2006:01  -27.63  21.71  1.40  0.22          (-0.75)  (0.78)  (2.73)***  (0.77) 
33 INDONESIA  1994:12-2001:01  1.87  -0.42  0.46  0.91 
       (2.98)***  (-1.11)  (1.01)  (2.85)*** 
34 KOREA  1999:09-2006:01  -17.13  15.74  0.95  0.39 
         (-0.85)  (0.98)  (1.42)  (0.97) 
35 MALAYSIA  1999:09-2006:01  0.22  0.93  0.01  1.55 
       (2.12)**  (4.15)***  (0.55)  (5.16)*** 
36 PHILIPPINES  1995:10-2006:01  4.31  0.46  7.39  0.91 
         (3.41)***  (2.02)**  (2.55)**  (4.74)*** 
37 SINGAPORE  1994:12-2006:01  -3.19  2.46  0.46  0.82 
       (-3.32)*** (3.44)***  (1.72)*  (3.87)*** 
38 THAILAND  1994:12-2006:01  -1.90  2.66  0.18  1.23 
       (-3.61)*** (6.63)***  (1.10)  (7.24)*** 
39 CHINA  2003:09-2006:01             
                    
40 CZECH REPUBLIC  1997:07-2006:01             
                    
41 SLOVAK REPUBLIC 2003:02-2006:01             
                    
42 HUNGARY  1998:06-2006:01             
                    
43 POLAND  1998:05-2006:01  7.55  -1.20  1.90  0.90 
         (7.46)***  (-4.65)***  (1.03)  (3.90)*** 
  
Table 4: The descriptive statistics 1994-2006 in the cross section regression 
4.1. Summary Statistics for risk premia and their determinants 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max  
RP3_6  40  -1.5328  0.8325  -3.7883  0.6808  
RP3_12  36  0.1377  0.1167  -0.1435  0.5571  
GGDP  43  -3.8833  0.8013  -6.0142  -1.5871  
INFL  43  1.5289  0.8927  -0.5443  4.1087  
DEFGDP  42  -0.2599  0.4146  -1.6359  0.6707  
DEBTGDP  41  3.7382  0.6488  2.0096  4.7878  
GDP94  42  8.9157  0.7357  7.2464  9.8349  
POLCON  42  -0.3917  0.2945  -1.7863  -0.1134  
ICRG  43  4.3107  0.1489  3.9604  4.4848  
VREER  32  2.0933  0.5419  1.1106  2.9326  
 
4.2. Correlations between risk premium and macroeconomic and political variables 
   RP3_6  GGDP  INFL  DEFGDP  DEBTGDP  POLCON5  ICRG  GDP94  VINFL  VREER 
RP3_6  1                  
GGDP  0.4313  1                
INFL  0.5700  0.9069  1              
DEFGDP  -0.1669  -0.0511  -0.3336  1            
DEBTGDP  -0.1518  -0.2136  -0.2458  -0.1253  1          
POLCON5  -0.5805  -0.5743  -0.6047  0.1159  0.2220  1        
ICRG  -0.6275  -0.6109  -0.6733  0.2486  0.0602  0.7843  1      
GDP94  -0.7674  -0.7118  -0.7334  0.2221  0.2222  0.6631  0.7217  1    
VINFL  0.5250  0.7496  0.8829  -0.2913  -0.2544  -0.5470  -0.6101  -0.6645  1  
VREER  0.5015  0.5284  0.5689  -0.1844  -0.2585  -0.4178  -0.4773  -0.6448  0.7270  1 
 
 Table 5: The cross section regression: determinants of the risk premia for holding 6-month treasury bills (RP3_6) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Inflation  1.41  (0.60)**  1.35  (0.61)**  1.18  (0.47)**  0.85  (0.31)*** 
Deficit (%GDP)  1.62  (0.87)*  1.67  (0.94)*  1.12  (0.54)**  1.15  (0.40)*** 
Economic Growth  -1.73  (0.75)**  -1.73  (0.78)**  -1.33  (0.61)**  -0.76  (0.38)** 
Debt (%GDP)  0.17  (0.22)  0.13  (0.25)         
REER volatility  0.22  (0.39)  0.24  (0.44)         
ICRG      -1.19  (2.08)         
POLCON5      0.06  (1.11)         
                 
Control Variable                 
Intial Income (GDP94)  -1.09  (0.73)  -0.93  (0.74)  -0.82  (0.61)  -0.61  (0.30)* 
Group dummies                 
EMU  0.28  (0.42)  0.36  (0.52)  0.04  (0.24)  -0.1  (0.20) 
POOR  -0.1  (1.00)  0.00  (1.02)  0.16  (0.76)  0.19  (0.38) 
                 
R^2  0.74    0.75    0.55    0.64   
Number of Countries  29    29    38    31   
                 
P-value for httest  0.23    0.28    0.07    0.37   
P-value for white test  0.07    0.03    0.00    0.31   
P-value for Ovtest  0.01    0.02    0.03    0.44   
                 
Beta value  Col (3)  Col(4)             
Inflation  1.29  1.23             
Deficit (%GDP)  0.53  0.55             
Economic Growth  -1.15  -0.91             
Intial Income (GDP94)  -0.76  -0.65             
EMU  0.02  -0.08             
POOR  0.10  0.16                   
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the risk premia for holding 6-month treasury bills (comparing to 3-month treasury bills) over 1994-2006, in natural logarithm. ***, ** 
and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Numbers shown in parentheses are MacKinnon and White (1985) heteroskedasticity-consistent (hc3) standard 
errors. All regressions have a constant. The group dummies are for 1) Countries joining European Monetary Union (EMU); 2) Countries, which are not members of EMU 
but have high income (NEU_RICH); 3) Countries, which are neither members of EMU nor have high income (POOR). In the regression, the omitted category is 
NEU_RICH. The hettest performs the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity in the independent variables. The whitetst performs a variant of the White test for 
heteroskedasticity that uses the predicted values from the original regression and their squared values. The ovtest performs the regression specification error test (RESET) 
for omitted variables. The corresponding numbers shown are p-values. Table 6 Descriptive Statistics 1994-2006 in the panel regression 
6.1 Summary Statistics for risk premium and its determinants 
Variable  Obs  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Min  Max 
RP36  391  0.028  0.041  -0.215  0.226 
GGDP  454  0.024  0.107  -1.439  1.486 
DEBTGDP  324  3.805  0.630  1.687  4.932 
REER  360  4.626  0.109  4.093  4.915 
VREER  360  0.625  0.606  -0.991  2.410 
INFL  451  0.355  0.389  -0.504  2.429 
DEFGDP  350  -0.054  0.147  -1.181  0.446 
POLCON  409  -0.337  0.227  -1.903  -0.113 
ICRG  418  4.353  0.138  3.883  4.565 
 
 6.2. Correlations between risk premium and macroeconomics and political variables 
   RP36  GGDP  DEBTGDP  REER  VREER  INFL  DEFGDP  POLCON  ICRG 
RP36  1                 
GGDP  0.236  1               
DEBTGDP  -0.028  -0.008  1             
REER  -0.037  -0.119  -0.099  1           
VREER  0.427  0.250  -0.280  0.100  1         
INFL  0.343  0.705  -0.112  -0.072  0.374  1       
DEFGDP  -0.121  -0.049  -0.064  -0.032  -0.139  -0.213  1     
POLCON  -0.416  -0.256  -0.006  0.169  -0.163  -0.242  0.143  1   
ICRG  -0.498  -0.407  -0.068  0.112  -0.415  -0.538  0.318  0.471  1 
  
Table 7: Risk premium (rp 3_6) panel regressions 
Table7.1. The determinant of the risk premia (whole sample), 1994-2006) 
Dependent variable: RP36_(i,t)  OLS  FE  FE-IV  LSDVC 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
RP36_(i,t-1)  0.824  0.830  0.257  0.255  0.236  0.236  0.416  0.421 
  [0.00]***  [0.00]***  [0.05]**  [0.05]**  [0.05]**  [0.04]**  [0.00]***  [0.00]*** 
GGDP_(i,t)  -0.254  -0.262  -0.502  -0.520  -0.978  -0.906  -0.461  -0.481 
  [0.26]  [0.28]  [0.05]**  [0.05]**  [0.23]  [0.23]  [0.07]*  [0.05]** 
DEBTGDP_(i,t)  0.004  0.005  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.004  0.004 
  [0.06]*  [0.07]*  [0.97]  [0.96]  [0.82]  [0.82]  [0.70]  [0.69] 
REER_(i,t)  -0.005  -0.007  0.015  0.020  0.012  0.018  0.012  0.019 
  [0.84]  [0.78]  [0.47]  [0.27]  [0.68]  [0.50]  [0.58]  [0.43] 
VREER_(i,t)  0.008  0.009  0.010  0.010  0.009  0.009  0.010  0.010 
  [0.00]***  [0.00]***  [0.00]***  [0.00]***  [0.00]***  [0.00]***  [0.01]***  [0.01]*** 
INFL_(i,t)  0.021  0.024  0.010  0.013  0.017  0.019  0.014  0.019 
  [0.16]  [0.08]*  [0.60]  [0.55]  [0.47]  [0.48]  [0.37]  [0.23] 
DEFGDP_(i,t)  0.016  0.014  0.020  0.020  0.024  0.022  0.022  0.022 
  [0.19]  [0.28]  [0.11]  [0.10]*  [0.16]  [0.18]  [0.23]  [0.24] 
POLCON_(i,t)    -0.004    -0.003    0.001    -0.005 
    [0.74]    [0.79]    [0.96]    [0.73] 
ICRG_(i,t)    0.015    -0.034    -0.048    -0.031 
    [0.37]    [0.34]    [0.27]    [0.43] 
                 
Anderson cannon p-value          0.000  0.000     
Hansen J statistics p-value          0.973  0.960     
                 
Groups  27  27  27  27  27  27  27  27 
Observations  186  186  186  186  186  186  186  186 
Notes: 27 countries. P-value is reported in brackets below point estimates.  
Year dummies are included in all models.  
* stands for significant at 10%; ** stands for significant at 5%; *** stands for significant at 1%. 
The LSDV estimator is the fixed effect estimator. In the OLS and LSDV estimators, the standard errors computed are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation. 
The LSDVC estimator is the corrected LSDV estimator developed by Kiviet (1995) for finite sample bias and contructed for dynamic unbalanced panels by Bruno (2005).  
 
  
Table7.2: The determinant of the risk premia (rich countries), 1994-2006.  
Dependent variable: RP36_(i,t)  OLS  LSDV(FE)  LSDVC 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
RP36_(i,t-1)  0.493  0.481  0.229  0.237  0.426  0.436 
  [0.00]***  [0.00]***  [0.00]***  [0.00]***  [0.00]***  [0.00]*** 
GGDP_(i,t)  -0.350  -0.340  -0.354  -0.340  -0.337  -0.319 
  [0.03]**  [0.03]**  [0.06]*  [0.06]*  [0.07]*  [0.08]* 
DEBTGDP_(i,t)  0.003  0.004  0.008  0.008  0.008  0.009 
  [0.18]  [0.05]**  [0.40]  [0.33]  [0.27]  [0.23] 
REER_(i,t)  0.020  0.021  0.065  0.064  0.059  0.058 
  [0.07]*  [0.07]*  [0.00]***  [0.00]***  [0.01]***  [0.01]*** 
VREER_(i,t)  0.003  0.004  0.005  0.006  0.005  0.005 
  [0.13]  [0.10]*  [0.17]  [0.13]  [0.11]  [0.09]* 
INFL_(i,t)  0.020  0.024  0.027  0.025  0.029  0.027 
  [0.17]  [0.11]  [0.17]  [0.17]  [0.06]*  [0.09]* 
DEFGDP_(i,t)  0.006  0.005  0.022  0.022  0.021  0.021 
  [0.30]  [0.36]  [0.05]**  [0.05]**  [0.10]*  [0.10]* 
POLCON_(i,t)    0.008    0.000    -0.001 
    [0.32]    [0.94]    [0.95] 
ICRG_(i,t)    0.019    0.031    0.038 
    [0.07]*    [0.34]    [0.34] 
             
Groups  21  21  21  21  21  21 
Observations  151  151  151  151  151  151 
Notes: 21 countries. P-value is reported in brackets below point estimates.  
Year dummies are included in all models.  
* stands for significant at 10%; ** stands for significant at 5%; *** stands for significant at 1%. 
The LSDV estimator is the fixed effect estimator. In the OLS and LSDV estimators, the standard errors computed are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation. 
The LSDVC estimator is the corrected LSDV estimator developed by Kiviet (1995) for finite sample bias and contructed for dynamic unbalanced panels by Bruno (2005).  
  
Table7.3. The determinant of the risk premia (poor countries), 1994-2006. 
Dependent variable: RP36_(i,t)  OLS  LSDV(FE) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
GGDP_(i,t)  2.855      -1.808     
  (0.48)      (0.08)*     
REER_(i,t)  -0.160      -0.034     
  (0.13)      (0.63)     
VREER_(i,t)  0.043  0.050    0.036  0.030   
  (0.03)**  (0.06)*    (0.01)***  (0.01)***   
INFL_(i,t)  0.016  0.081  0.107  0.111  0.078  0.079 
  (0.86)  (0.26)  (0.00)***  (0.03)**  (0.08)*  (0.03)** 
DEFGDP_(i,t)  0.315      -0.073     
  (0.05)**      0.264     
             
             
Groups  4  4  8  4  4  8 
Observations  34  34  70  34  34  70 
Notes: P-value is reported in brackets below point estimates.  
Year dummies are not included in all models.  
* stands for significant at 10%; ** stands for significant at 5%; *** stands for significant at 1%. 
The LSDV estimator is the fixed effect estimator. In the OLS and LSDV estimators, the standard errors computed are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation. 
 Figure 1: Excess holding yield of 6 month Treasury Bills and estimated risk premia 













1.4: Belgium  










 1.9: Colombia  
 

















































































1.34: Portugal  
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 1.43: South Africa  
 Figure 2 : Risk Premium of sample countries over the period of 1994-2006  
 
























Figure 3.1: Risk premia comparisons by country groups  
 








Figure 3.2: Risk premium comparisons by income 
A: Risk premia for non-high income countries  
 
 
B: Risk premia for high income countries  
 Figure 4: Variable plots, average 1994-2006 
 
Figure 4.1: Initial level of income 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Average economic growth over 1994-2006. 
 
 






Figure 4.4: Average real effective exchange rate over 1994-2006. 
 
 









Figure 4.7: Government debt (% GDP), 1994-2006 
 
 




Figure 4.9: Political constraint index (POLCON5), 1994-2006. 
 Figure 5: Bivariate regression plots of mean value of country’s risk premia and 
explanatory variables (1994-2006). 
Figure 5.1: Bivariate regression plots of the average risk premia and initial level of 
country’s income 
 
Figure 5.2: Bivariate regression plots of the average risk premia and economic growth. 
 
Figure 5.3: Bivariate regression plots of the average risk premia and inflation. 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Bivariate regression plots of the average risk premia and real effective 
exchange rate 
 
Figure 5.5: Bivariate regression plots of the average risk premia and volatility of the real 
effective exchange rate. 
 
Figure 5.6: Bivariate regression plots of the average risk premia and government budget 
deficit (% of GDP) 
  
Figure 5.7: Bivariate regression plots of the average risk premia and government debt (% 
of GDP). 
 
Figure 5.8: Bivariate regression plots of the average risk premia and the political risk 
index. 
 
Figure 5.9: Bivariate regression plots of the average risk premia and the political 
constraint index. 
 